The basic premises of the theory of knowledge of Mach and Avenarius were frankly, simply and clearly stated by them in their first philosophical works. We will turn to these works, postponing until further presentation the analysis of the amendments and erasures subsequently given by these writers.

“The task of science,” Mach wrote in 1872, “can only be the following: 1. To investigate the laws of connection between ideas (psychology). – 2. To discover the laws of connection between sensations (physics). – 3. To explain the laws of connection between sensations and representations (psychophysics)".*

This is quite clear.

* E.Mach."Die Geschichte und die Wurzel des Satzes von der Erhaltung der Arbeit." Vortrag gehalten in der K. Böhmn. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften am 15. Nov. 1871, Prag, 1872, S. 57-58 ( E.Max."The principle of job conservation, history and its root." Paper read at the Royal Bohemian Scientific Society on November 15, 1871, Prague, 1872, pp. 57-58. Ed.).

The subject of physics is the connection between sensations, and not between things or bodies, the image of which is our sensations. And in 1883, in his Mechanics, Mach repeated the same idea:

“Sensations are not “symbols of things.” Rather, a “thing” is a mental symbol for a complex of sensations that has relative stability. Not things (bodies), but colors, sounds, pressures, spaces, times (what we usually call sensations) are real elements peace."*

* E.Mach."Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung historisch-kritisch dargestellt", 3. Auflage, Leipz., 1897, S. 473 ( E.Mach."Mechanics. Historical and critical essay on its development", 3rd ed., Leipzig, 1897, p. 473. Ed.).

We will talk about this word “elements”, which was the fruit of twelve years of “reflection,” below. Now we should note that Mach admits here directly that things or bodies are complexes of sensations, and that he quite clearly contrasts his philosophical point of view with the opposite theory, according to which sensations are “symbols” of things (more precisely, images or representations of things ). This last theory is philosophical materialism. For example, the materialist Friedrich Engels, a well-known collaborator of Marx and the founder of Marxism, constantly and without exception speaks in his writings about things and their mental images or reflections (Gedanken-Abbilder), and it is self-evident that these mental images arise only from sensations. It would seem that this basic view of the “philosophy of Marxism” should be known to everyone who talks about it, and especially to everyone who on behalf of this philosophy appears in print. But in view of the extraordinary confusion introduced by our Machians, we have to repeat what is generally known. We open the first paragraph of “Anti-Dühring” and read: “...things and their mental representations...”*

* Fr.Engels."Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft", 5. Auflage, Stuttg., 1904, S. 6 ( Fr. Engels."The revolution in science carried out by Herr Eugen Dühring", 5th ed., Stuttgart, 1904, p. 6. Ed.).

Or the first paragraph of the philosophical section:

“Where does thinking get these principles from?” (we are talking about the basic principles of all knowledge). “From itself? No... Thinking can never draw and derive forms of being from itself, but only from the external world... Principles are not the starting point of research” (as it turns out with Dühring, who wants to be a materialist, but cannot consistently pursue materialism), "and its final result; these principles are not applied to nature and human history, but are abstracted from them; it is not nature, not humanity that conforms to the principles, but, on the contrary, the principles are true only insofar as they correspond to nature and history. This is the only materialist view of the subject, and Dühring’s opposite view is an idealist view, turning real relationships upside down, constructing the real world from thoughts..." (ibid., 8.21). 13

And Engels pursues this “sole materialist view,” we repeat, everywhere and without exception, mercilessly persecuting Dühring for the slightest deviation from materialism to idealism. Anyone who reads Anti-Dühring and Ludwig Feuerbach with a little attention will come across dozens of examples where Engels talks about things and their images in the human head, in our consciousness, thinking, etc. Engels does not say that sensations or ideas are “symbols” of things, for consistent materialism must put “images,” pictures, or representations here in the place of the “symbol,” as we will show in detail in its place. But now we are talking not at all about this or that formulation of materialism, but about the opposition of materialism to idealism, about the difference between the two main lines in philosophy. Should we go from things to sensations and thoughts? Or from thoughts and sensations to things? The first, i.e. Engels adheres to the materialist line. Second, i.e. The idealistic line is followed by Mach. No subterfuge, no sophistry (of which we will encounter many more) will eliminate the clear and indisputable fact that E. Mach’s teaching about things as complexes of sensations is subjective idealism, is a simple repetition of Berkeleyism. If bodies are “complexes of sensations,” as Mach says, or “combinations of sensations,” as Berkeley said, then it inevitably follows that the whole world is only my idea. Based on such a premise, one cannot come to the existence of other people except oneself: this is pure solipsism. No matter how much Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and Co. renounce it, in fact they cannot get rid of solipsism without blatant logical absurdities. To explain even more clearly this basic element of the philosophy of Machism, we present some additional quotations from Mach’s works. Here is a sample from “Analysis of Sensations” (Russian translation by Kotlyar, published by Skirmunt. M., 1907):

"Before us is a body with a point S. When we touch the point, bring it into contact with our body, we get a prick. We can see the point without feeling the prick. But when we feel the prick, we will find the point. Thus, the visible point there is a permanent core, and a prick is something random, which, depending on the circumstances, may not be connected with the core. With the increase in similar phenomena, one finally gets used to considering All properties of bodies as “actions” emanating from such permanent nuclei and produced on our I through the mediation of our body - “actions” that we call “ sensations""... (page 20).

In other words: people “get used” to taking the point of view of materialism, to consider sensations as the result of the action of bodies, things, nature on our senses. This harmful “habit” for philosophical idealists (adopted by all of humanity and all of natural science!) is extremely disliked by Mach, and he begins to destroy it:

“...But with this, these nuclei lose all their sensual content, becoming bare abstract symbols...”

Old honk, most venerable professor! This is a literal repetition of Berkeley, who said that matter is a naked abstract symbol. But Ernst Mach actually walks naked, because if he does not admit that “sensible content” is an objective reality that exists independently of us, then he is left with only “naked abstract” I, always large and written in italics I= "a crazy piano that imagined that it alone existed in the world." If the “sensory content” of our sensations is not the external world, then nothing exists except this naked I, engaged in empty “philosophical” tricks. A stupid and fruitless endeavor!

"...Then it is true that the world consists only of our sensations. But then we only and we know our sensations, and the assumption of those nuclei, as well as the interaction between them, the fruit of which is only sensations, appears to be completely idle and unnecessary. Such a view can only be good for half-hearted realism or for half-hearted criticism."

We have written out the entire 6th paragraph of Mach's "anti-metaphysical remarks". This is complete plagiarism from Berkeley. Not a single consideration, not a single glimmer of thought, except that “we feel only our sensations.” From this there is only one conclusion, namely, that “the world consists only of my sensations." The word "our", put by Mach instead of the word "mine", was put by him illegally. With this one word Mach already reveals that very "half-heartedness" of which he accuses others. For if the "assumption" of the external world is "idle", the assumption that the needle exists independently of me and that interaction occurs between my body and the point of the needle, if this whole assumption is truly “idle and unnecessary,” then the “assumption” of the existence of other people is, first of all, idle and unnecessary. I, and all other people, like the entire outside world, fall into the category of idle “nuclei”. Talk about "our" sensations are impossible from this point of view, and since Mach speaks about them, this only means that he is blatantly half-hearted. This only proves that his philosophy is idle and empty words, which the author himself does not believe in.

Here is a particularly clear example of Mach's half-heartedness and confusion. In §6 of Chapter XI of the same “Analysis of Sensations” we read:

“If, while I feel something, I myself or someone else could observe my brain using all kinds of physical and chemical means, then it would be possible to determine with what processes occurring in the body a certain kind of sensation is associated ..." (197).

Very good! This means that our sensations are connected with certain processes occurring in the body in general and in our brain in particular? Yes, Mach quite definitely makes this “assumption” - it would be wise not to make it from the point of view of natural science. But excuse me, this is the very “assumption” of those very “nuclei and the interaction between them” that our philosopher declared unnecessary and idle! Bodies, we are told, are complexes of sensations; to go further than this, Mach assures us, to consider sensations as the product of the action of bodies on our sense organs is metaphysics, an idle, unnecessary assumption, etc. according to Berkeley. But the brain is the body. This means that the brain is also nothing more than a complex of sensations. It turns out that with the help of a complex of sensations I (and I, too, am nothing more than a complex of sensations) feel complexes of sensations. What a wonderful philosophy! First, declare sensations as “real elements of the world” and build an “original” Berkeleyanism on this, and then secretly smuggle in the opposite views that sensations are associated with certain processes in the body. Are these “processes” related to the metabolism between the “organism” and the outside world? Could this metabolism occur if the sensations of a given organism did not give it an objectively correct idea of ​​the external world?

Mach does not pose such inconvenient questions to himself, mechanically comparing scraps of Berkeleyism with the views of natural science, which spontaneously stands on the point of view of the materialist theory of knowledge...

“Sometimes they also ask the question,” Mach writes in the same paragraph, “whether “matter” (inorganic) does not also sense”... This means that organic matter senses, there is no question? This means that sensations are not something primary, but one of the properties of matter? Mach jumps over all the absurdities of Berkeleyism!.. “This question,” he says, “is quite natural, if we proceed from ordinary, widespread physical concepts, according to which matter is something direct and undoubtedly this real, on which everything is built, both organic and inorganic..."

Let us remember carefully this truly valuable recognition by Mach that ordinary and widespread physical ideas consider matter to be an immediate reality, and only one type of this reality (organic matter) has a clearly expressed property of feeling...

“After all, in this case,” Mach continues, “in a building consisting of matter, sensation must arise somehow suddenly, or it must exist in the very, so to speak, foundation of this building. our point of view, this question is fundamentally false. For us, matter is not the first given. Such primary data are rather elements(which in a certain sense are called sensations)..."

So, the primary data are sensations, although they are “connected” only with certain processes in organic matter! And, speaking of such absurdity, Mach seems to blame materialism (“the usual, widespread physical concept”) for the unresolved question of where sensation “comes from.” This is an example of the “refutations” of materialism by fideists and their henchmen. Does any other philosophical point of view “solve” a question for which insufficient data have yet been collected? Doesn’t Mach himself say in the same paragraph: “as long as this problem (to decide “how far sensations extend in the organic world”) is not solved in any special case, it is impossible to solve this question”?

The difference between materialism and “Machism” comes down, therefore, on this issue to the following. Materialism, in full agreement with natural science, takes matter as the primary given thing, considering consciousness, thinking, sensation to be secondary, because in a clearly expressed form, sensation is associated only with the highest forms of matter (organic matter), and “in the foundation of the building itself matter” one can only assume the existence of the ability , similar to the sensation. This is the assumption, for example, of the famous German naturalist Ernst Haeckel, the English biologist Lloyd Morgan and others, not to mention Diderot’s guess, which we cited above. Machism takes the opposite, idealistic point of view and immediately leads to nonsense, because, firstly, sensation is taken as primary despite the fact that it is associated only with certain processes in matter organized in a certain way; and, secondly, the basic premise that bodies are complexes of sensations is violated by the assumption of the existence of other living beings and other “complexes” in general, besides this great I.

The word “element,” which many naive people take (as we will see) for some kind of novelty and some kind of discovery, in fact only confuses the issue with a meaningless term, creates a false appearance of some kind of resolution or step forward. This appearance is false, because in fact it remains to be explored and explored how matter, which supposedly does not feel at all, is connected with matter, composed of the same atoms (or electrons) and at the same time possessing a clearly expressed ability to sense. Materialism clearly poses an as yet unresolved question and thereby pushes towards its resolution, pushes towards further experimental research. Machism, i.e. a kind of confused idealism, clogs the question and leads away from the right path through an empty verbal trick: “element”.

Here is one place in the last, summary and final philosophical work of Mach, showing the entire falsity of this idealistic twist. In "Knowledge and Error" we read:

"Whereas there is no difficulty to build (aufzubauen) every physical element from sensations, i.e. mental elements - one cannot even imagine (ist keine Möglihkeit abzusehen) how one could imagine (darstellen) any mental experience from the elements used by modern physics, i.e. from masses and movements (in that ossification - Starrheit - of these elements, which is convenient only for this special science)."*

* E.Mach."Erkenntnis und Irrtum", 2. Auflage, 1906, S. 12, Anmerkung ( E.Mach."Knowledge and Delusion", 2nd ed., 1906, p. 12, note. Ed.).

Engels speaks more than once with complete certainty about the ossification of concepts among many modern natural scientists, about their metaphysical (in the Marxist sense of the word, i.e., anti-dialectical) views. We will see below that Mach went crazy precisely at this point, not understanding, or not knowing, the relationship between relativism and dialectics. But that's not what we're talking about now. It is important for us to note here how clearly idealism Mach, despite the confusing, supposedly new terminology. No, you see, there is no difficulty in constructing any physical element from sensations, i.e. psychic elements! Oh, yes, such constructions, of course, are not difficult, for they are purely verbal constructions, empty scholasticism, serving to push through fideism. It is not surprising after this that Mach devotes his writings to immanents, that immanents are thrown on Mach’s neck, i.e. supporters of the most reactionary philosophical idealism. The “newest positivism” of Ernst Mach was only two hundred years late: Berkeley had already sufficiently shown that it is impossible to “construct” “from sensations, i.e., mental elements,” nothing but solipsism. As for materialism, to which Mach opposes his views here too, without naming the “enemy” directly and clearly, we have already seen the real views of materialists in the example of Diderot. These views do not consist in deriving sensation from the movement of matter or reducing it to the movement of matter, but in the fact that sensation is recognized as one of the properties of moving matter. Engels took Diderot's point of view on this issue. Engels fenced himself off from the “vulgar” materialists Vogt, Büchner and Moleschott, among other things, precisely because they were confused by the view that the brain secretes thought Also, how the liver secretes bile. But Mach, who constantly opposes his views to materialism, ignores, of course, all the great materialists, Diderot, Feuerbach, and Marx-Engels, just like all the other government professors of government philosophy.

To characterize the initial and basic view of Avenarius, let us take his first independent philosophical work: “Philosophy as thinking about the world according to the principle of least waste of effort” (“Prolegomena to the Critique of Pure Experience”), published in 1876. Bogdanov in his “Empiriomonism” (Book I, ed. 2, 1905, p. 9, note) says that “in the development of Mach’s views, the starting point was philosophical idealism, while Avenarius was characterized from the very beginning by a realistic tint.” Bogdanov said this because he believed Mach’s word: see “Analysis of Sensations,” Russian translation, page 288. But Bogdanov believed Mach in vain, and his statement is diametrically opposed to the truth. On the contrary, Avenarius’s idealism appears so clearly in the aforementioned work of 1876 that Avenarius himself was forced to admit it in 1891. In the preface to The Human Concept of the World, Avenarius says:

“Whoever has read my first systematic work, Philosophy, etc., will immediately assume that I should try to treat the questions of the Critique of Pure Experience primarily from an idealistic point of view” (“Der menschliche Weltbegriff”, 1891, Vorwort, 5 . IX*), but the “sterility of philosophical idealism” made me “doubt the correctness of my previous path” (3. X).

In philosophical literature this idealistic starting point of Avenarius is generally accepted; I will cite among the French writers Covelart, who says that in the Prolegomena Avenarius’s philosophical point of view is “monistic idealism”;** among the German writers I will name Avenarius’s student Rudolf Willi, who says that

“Avenarius in his youth – and especially in his work of 1876 – was completely under the spell (ganz im Banne) of so-called epistemological idealism.”***

* "The Human Concept of the World", 1891, preface, p. IX. Ed.

** F. Van Cauwelaert."L"empiriocriticisme" in "Revue Neo-Scolastique", 14 1907, February, page 51 ( F. Van Covelart."Empirio-criticism" in "Neo-Scholastic Review". Ed.).

*** Rudolf Willy."Gegen die Schulweisheit. Eine Kritik der Philosophie", München, 1905, S. 170 ( Rudolf Willie."Against School Wisdom, Critique of Philosophy", Munich, 1905, p. 170. Ed.).

And it would be ridiculous to deny idealism in Avenarius’s Prolegomena, when he directly says there that "only sensation can be thought of as existing"(pp. 10 and 65 of the second German edition; italics in quotations are ours throughout). This is how Avenarius himself sets out the content of §116 of his work. Here is the paragraph in its entirety:

“We have recognized that what exists (or: existing, das Seiende) is a substance endowed with sensation; substance disappears...” (“more economical”, you see, “less waste of effort” to think that there is no “substance” and no external world does not exist!) “...a sensation remains: existence should therefore be thought of as a sensation, the basis of which is no longer anything alien to sensation” (nichts Empfindungsloses).

So, sensation exists without “substance”, i.e. thought exists without a brain! Are there really philosophers capable of defending this brainless philosophy? Eat. Among them is Professor Richard Avenarius. And this defense, no matter how difficult it is for a healthy person to take it seriously, has to pause somewhat. Here is Avenarius’s reasoning in §§89-90 of the same work:

"...The position that movement causes sensation is based on only apparent experience. This experience, a separate act of which is perception, allegedly consists in the fact that sensation is generated in a certain kind of substance (the brain) as a result of transmitted movement (stimulation) and with the assistance of other material conditions (for example, blood).However - regardless of the fact that this generation has never been directly (selbst) observed - in order to construct the supposed experience, as in all its parts the actual experience, at least an empirical proof that the sensation supposedly caused in a certain substance by means of transmitted motion did not already exist previously in one way or another in this substance, so that the appearance of sensation cannot be understood otherwise than through an act of creation on the part of transmitted motion. proof that where sensation now appears, there was no sensation, even minimal, before, only this proof could establish a fact that, meaning a certain act of creation, contradicts all other experience and radically changes the rest of the understanding of nature (Naturanschauung ). But such proof is not given by any experience, and it cannot be given by any experience; on the contrary, the absolutely devoid of sensation state of the substance that subsequently experiences is only a hypothesis. And this hypothesis complicates and obscures our knowledge instead of simplifying and clarifying it.

If the so-called experience, as if through transmitted movement arises sensation in the substance, which begins to feel from this moment, turned out to be only apparent upon closer examination - then, perhaps, in the rest of the content of experience there is still enough material to state at least the relative origin of sensation from the conditions of movement, namely: to state that the sensation that exists is present, but hidden or minimal or for other reasons not amenable to our consciousness, due to the transmitted movement it is released or increased, or becomes conscious. However, this piece of the remaining content of experience is only an appearance. If we, by means of ideal observation, trace the movement proceeding from the moving substance A, transmitted through a series of intermediate centers and reaching the sensation-endowed substance B, we will find, at best, that the sensation in the substance B develops or increases simultaneously with the reception of the reaching movement - but we won't find that it happened due to movements..."

We have deliberately written out this entire refutation of materialism by Avenarius so that the reader can see what truly pathetic sophisms the “newest” empiriocritical philosophy operates with. Comparable with the reasoning of the idealist Avenarius materialistic reasoning... Bogdanov, at least as a punishment for him for betraying materialism!

In times long, long ago, nine whole years ago, when Bogdanov was half a “natural historical materialist” (i.e., a supporter of the materialist theory of knowledge, on which the vast majority of modern natural scientists spontaneously stand), when Bogdanov was only half confused by the confusion Ostwald, Bogdanov wrote:

“From ancient times and to this day, descriptive psychology has maintained the distinction between the facts of consciousness into three groups: the area of ​​sensations and ideas, the area of ​​feelings, the area of ​​impulses... The first group includes images phenomena of the external or internal world, taken in consciousness by themselves... Such an image is called a “sensation” if it is directly caused through the organs of external senses by an external phenomenon corresponding to it.”* A little further: “a sensation... arises in consciousness as the result of some impulse from the external environment, transmitted through the external senses" (222). Or again: "Sensations form the basis of the life of consciousness, its direct connection with the outside world" (240). "At every step in the process of sensation, a transition of energy occurs external irritation into a fact of consciousness" (133).

And even in 1905, when Bogdanov managed, with the supportive assistance of Ostwald and Mach, to move from a materialist point of view in philosophy to an idealist one, he wrote (through forgetfulness!) in “Empiriomonism”:

“As is known, the energy of external stimulation, transformed in the terminal apparatus of the nerve into an insufficiently studied, but alien to any mysticism, “telegraphic” form of nerve current, reaches primarily neurons located in the so-called “lower” centers - ganglion, spinal, subcortical" (Book I, ed. 2, 1905, p. 118).

* A. Bogdanov."The main elements of a historical view of nature", St. Petersburg, 1899, p. 216.

For every natural scientist, but confused by professorial philosophy, as well as for every materialist, sensation is truly a direct connection of consciousness with the external world, it is the transformation of the energy of external stimulation into a fact of consciousness. Every person has observed this transformation millions of times and actually observes it at every step. The sophism of idealistic philosophy lies in the fact that sensation is taken not as a connection between consciousness and the external world, but as a partition, a wall separating consciousness from the external world - not as an image of an external phenomenon corresponding to sensation, but as “the only thing that exists.” Avenarius gave only a slightly modified form to this old sophism, worn out by Bishop Berkeley. Since we do not yet know all the conditions of the connection between sensation and matter organized in a certain way that we observe every minute, we therefore recognize sensation alone as existing - this is what Avenarius’s sophism boils down to.

To finish characterizing the main idealistic premises of empirio-criticism, let us briefly point out the English and French representatives of this philosophical movement. About the Englishman Karl Pearson, Mach directly says that he “agrees with his epistemological (erkenntniskritischen) views on all essential points” (“Mechanics”, op. cit., p. IX). K. Pearson, in turn, expresses his agreement with Mach.* For Pearson, “real things” are “sense impressions”. Pearson declares any recognition of things beyond the limits of sensory perception to be metaphysics. Pearson fights materialism (neither Feuerbach nor Marx-Engels) in the most decisive way - the arguments do not differ from those discussed above. But at the same time, any desire to imitate materialism (the specialty of Russian Machists) is so alien to Pearson; Pearson is so... careless that, without inventing “new” nicknames for his philosophy, he simply declares the views of both his own and Mach’s "idealistic"(p. 326 cit. ed.)! Pearson traces his ancestry directly back to Berkeley and Hume. Pearson's philosophy, as we will see repeatedly below, is distinguished by much greater integrity and thoughtfulness than Mach's philosophy.

* Karl Pearson."The Grammar of Science", 2nd ed., Lond., 1900, p. 326 ( Karl Pearson."The Grammar of Science", 2nd ed., London, 1900, p. 326. Ed.).

Mach specifically expresses his solidarity with the French physicists P. Duhem and Henri Poincaré.* We will have to talk about the philosophical views of these writers, especially the confused and inconsistent ones, in the chapter on new physics. Here it is enough to note that for Poincaré things are “groups of sensations”** and that Duhem also expresses a similar view in passing.***

** "Analysis of sensations", page 4. Cf. Preface to "Erkenntnis und Irrtum", ed. 2nd.

*** Henri Poincare."La Valeur de la Science", Paris, 1905 (there is a Russian translation), passim ( Henri Poincaré."The Value of Science", Paris, 1905, in several places. Ed.).

**** P. Duhem."La theory physique, son objet et sa structure", P., 1906. Cp. pp. 6, 10 ( P. Duhem."Theory of physics, its subject and structure", Paris, 1906. Cf. pp. 6, 10. Ed.).

Let us move on to how Mach and Avenarius, having recognized the idealistic nature of their initial views, corrected them in his subsequent works.

2. "DISCOVERY OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE WORLD"

Under this title, Friedrich Adler, a privatdozent at the University of Zurich, writes about Mach, perhaps the only German writer who also wants to complement Marx with Machism.* And we must give justice to this naive privatdozent that with his simplicity he does a disservice to Machism. The question is posed at least clearly and sharply: did Mach really “discover the elements of the world”? Then, of course, only completely backward and ignorant people can still remain materialists. Or is this discovery a return of Mach to old philosophical errors?

* Friedrich W.Adler."Die Entdeckung der Weltelemente (Zu E.Machs 70. Geburtstag)", "Der Kampf", 15 1908, no. 5 (Februar). Translated in The International Socialist Review, 16 1908, No. 10 (April) ( Friedrich W. Adler.“Discovery of the Elements of the World (On the occasion of E. Mach’s seventieth birthday)”, “Struggle”, 1908, No. 5 (February). Translated in the International Socialist Review, 1908, No. 10 (April). Ed.). One article of this Adler was translated into Russian in the collection “Historical Materialism”.

We have seen that Mach in 1872 and Avenarius in 1876 take a purely idealistic point of view; for them the world is our sensation. In 1883, Mach's Mechanics was published, and in the preface to the first edition, Mach refers specifically to Avenarius's Prolegomena, welcoming thoughts that are “extremely close” (sehr verwandte) to his philosophy. Here is the discussion in this Mechanics about the elements:

"All natural science can only depict (nachbilden und vorbilden) the complexes of those elements, which we usually call sensations. It's about the connection between these elements. The connection between A (heat) and B (fire) belongs to physics, the connection between A and N (nerves) belongs to physiology. Neither connection exists separately, both exist together. Only for a while can we be distracted from one or the other. Even apparently purely mechanical processes are thus always physiological” (3.499 cit. German ed.).

The same thing in "Analysis of sensations":

“...Where next to the expressions: “element”, “complex of elements” or instead of them the designations “sensation”, “complex of sensations” are used, one must always keep in mind that the elements are sensations only in this communications"(namely: connections A, B, C with K, L, M, i.e. connections of “complexes that are usually called bodies” with “the complex that we call our body”), “in this regard, in this functional dependence. In another functional dependence, they are at the same time physical objects" (Russian translation, pp. 23 and 17). “Color is a physical object if we pay attention, for example, to its dependence on the light source illuminating it (other colors, warmth, space, etc.). But if we pay attention to addiction him from retina(elements K, L, M...), before us – psychological an object, feeling"(ibid., p. 24).

So, the discovery of the elements of the world is that

1. everything that exists is declared by sensation,
2. sensations are called elements,
3. elements are divided into physical and mental; the latter is something that depends on the human nerves and the human body in general; first – does not depend;
4. the connection of physical and the connection of mental elements is declared not to exist separately from one another; they exist only together;
5. You can only temporarily be distracted from one or another connection;
6. The “new” theory is declared to be devoid of “one-sidedness.”*

* Mach in “Analysis of Sensations”: “Elements are usually called sensations. In view of the fact that this name implies an already defined one-sided theory, we prefer to speak briefly about the elements” (27-28).

There really is no one-sidedness here, but there is a most incoherent confusion of opposing philosophical points of view. Once you leave only From my feelings, you do not correct the “one-sidedness” of your idealism with the word “element”, but only confuse the matter, cowardly hiding from your own theory. In words, you eliminate the opposition between the physical and the mental,* between materialism (which takes nature, matter as primary) and idealism (which takes spirit, consciousness, sensation as primary) - in fact, you are immediately restoring this opposition again, restoring it secretly , departing from its main premise! For if the elements are sensations, then you have no right to accept for a second the existence of “elements” regardless from my nerves, from my consciousness. And since you admit such physical objects, independent of my nerves, of my sensations, that generate sensation only by influencing my retina, then you shamefully abandon your “one-sided” idealism and move to the point of view of “one-sided” materialism! If color is a sensation only depending on the retina (as natural science forces you to admit), then it means that rays of light falling on the retina produce the sensation of color. This means that outside of us, independently of us and of our consciousness, there is a movement of matter, say, waves of the ether of a certain length and a certain speed, which, acting on the retina, produce in a person a sensation of one color or another. This is exactly what natural science looks at. It explains the different sensations of one color or another by different lengths of light waves that exist outside the human retina, outside a person and independently of him. This is materialism: matter, acting on our senses, produces sensation. The sensation depends on the brain, nerves, retina, etc., i.e. from matter organized in a certain way. The existence of matter does not depend on sensation. Matter is primary. Sensation, thought, consciousness is the highest product of matter organized in a special way. These are the views of materialism in general and Marx-Engels in particular. Mach and Avenarius secretly materialism is being pushed through through the word "element", which supposedly relieves their theory of the “one-sidedness” of subjective idealism, supposedly allows us to assume the dependence of the mental on the retina, nerves, etc., to assume the independence of the physical from the human body. In fact, of course, the trick with the word “element” is the most pathetic sophism, for a materialist, reading Mach and Avenarius, will immediately raise the question: what are “elements”? It would indeed be childish to think that by inventing a new word one can get rid of the main philosophical trends. Either the "element" is feeling, as all empirio-critics say, and Mach, and Avenarius, and Petzoldt, * etc. - then your philosophy, gentlemen, is idealism, trying in vain to cover up the nakedness of his solipsism with the garb of more “objective” terminology. Either the “element” is not a sensation, in which case it is not connected with your “new” word absolutely no thought, then it’s just putting on airs with a dummy.

* “The opposition between the Self and the world, the sensation or phenomenon and the thing then disappears, and the whole matter comes down only to the combination of elements” (“Analysis of Sensations”, p. 21),

** Joseph Petzoldt."Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung", Bd. I, Leipz., 1900, S. 113 ( Joseph Petzoldt."Introduction to the Philosophy of Pure Experience", vol. I, Leipzig, 1900, p. 113. Ed.): “Elements are sensations in the usual sense of simple, indecomposable perceptions” (Wahrnehmungen).

Take, for example, Petzoldt - the last word of empirio-criticism, according to the characterization of the first and greatest Russian empirio-critic V. Lesevich.* Having defined the elements as sensations, he declares in the second volume of the said work:

“We must beware of taking the word “sensation” in the position: “sensations are elements of the world” as denoting something only subjective and therefore airy, transforming the ordinary picture of the world into an illusion (verflüchtigendes).**

* V.Lesevich.“What is scientific” (read: fashionable, professorial, eclectic) “philosophy?”, St. Petersburg, 1891, pp. 229 and 247.

** Petzoldt. Bd. 2, Lpz., 1904, S. 329 (vol. 2, Leipzig, 1904, p. 329, Ed.).

Whatever hurts someone, that’s what they talk about! Petzoldt feels that the world is “evaporating” (verflüchtigt sich) or turning into an illusion, if we consider sensations as elements of the world. And the good Petzoldt thinks to help the matter by means of a reservation: do not take the sensation for something only subjective! Well, isn't this a funny sophistry? Will the matter change whether we “mistake” a sensation for a sensation or try to stretch the meaning of this word? Does this make the fact that a person’s sensations are associated with normally functioning nerves, retina, brain, etc. disappear? that the external world exists independently of our sensation? If you do not want to get away with subterfuge, if you seriously want to “beware” of subjectivism and solipsism, then you must first of all beware of the basic idealistic premises of your philosophy; you need to replace the idealistic line of your philosophy (from sensations to the external world) with a materialistic one (from the external world to sensations); we must discard the empty and confused verbal ornament: “element,” and simply say: color is the result of the action of a physical object on the retina = sensation is the result of the action of matter on our sense organs.

Let's take Avenarius as well. On the issue of “elements”, the most valuable is given by his last (and, perhaps, most important for understanding his philosophy) work: “Notes on the concept of the subject of psychology.”* The author gave here, by the way, an extremely “visual” tablet (p. 410 in Volume XVIII), which we reproduce in its main part:

* R.Avenarius,"Bemerkungen zum Begriff des Gegenstandes der Psychologie" in "Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie", 17 Bd. XVIII (1894) and XIX (1895) ( P. Avenarius."Remarks on the concept of the subject of psychology" in the "Three months of Scientific Philosophy", volumes, XVIII (1894) and XIX (1895). Ed.).

Compare with this what Mach says after all his explanations about the “elements” (“Analysis of Sensations,” p. 33): “It is not bodies that cause sensations, but complexes of elements (complexes of sensations) that form bodies.” Here is the “discovery of the elements of the world”, which has surpassed the one-sidedness of idealism and materialism! First they will assure us that “elements” = something new, both physical and mental, and then they will secretly make an amendment: instead of a crudely materialistic distinction between matter (bodies, things) and the mental (sensations, memories, fantasies), they give the teaching of “the latest positivism” "about the elements of things and the elements of thought. Adler (Fritz) gained a little from the “discovery of the elements of the world”!

Bogdanov, objecting to Plekhanov, wrote in 1906:

“...I cannot recognize myself as a Machist in philosophy. In the general philosophical concept, I took only one thing from Mach - the idea of ​​​​the neutrality of the elements of experience in relation to the “physical” and “mental”, of the dependence of these characteristics only on communications experience" ("Empiriomonism", book III, St. Petersburg, 1906, p. XLI).

This is the same as if a religious person said: I cannot recognize myself as a supporter of religion, because I took from these supporters “only one thing”: faith in God. “Only one thing,” taken by Bogdanov from Mach, is main mistake Machism, the main incorrectness of this whole philosophy. Bogdanov’s deviations from empirio-criticism, to which Bogdanov himself attaches very great importance, are in fact completely secondary and do not go beyond the detailed, particular, individual differences between the various empirio-critics approved by Mach and those who approve of Mach (more on this below). Therefore, when Bogdanov was angry at being confused with the Machists, he only revealed a misunderstanding indigenous the differences between materialism and what is common to Bogdanov and all other Machists. It is not important how Bogdanov developed or corrected or worsened Machism. The important thing is that he abandoned the materialist point of view and thereby condemned himself inevitably to confusion and idealistic wanderings.

In 1899, as we have seen, Bogdanov took the correct point of view when he wrote:

“The image of a person standing in front of me, directly given to me by sight, is a sensation.”*

* "Basic elements of a historical view of nature", p. 216. Cf. the above quotes.

Bogdanov did not bother to criticize this old view of his. He took his word, blindly believed Mach and began to repeat after him that the “elements” of experience are neutral in relation to the physical and mental.

“As has been clarified by the latest positive philosophy, the elements of mental experience,” Bogdanov wrote in Book I of “Empiriomonism” (2nd ed., p. 90), “are identical with the elements of any experience in general, since they are identical with the elements of physical experience.”

Or in 1906 (book III, p. XX):

“And as for “idealism,” can we talk about it only on the basis that the elements of “physical experience” are recognized as identical with the elements of “mental” or elementary sensations - when this is simply an undoubted fact.”

This is where the real source of all Bogdanov’s philosophical misadventures is - a source he has in common with all the Machists. One can and should talk about idealism when the “elements of physical experience” (i.e. the physical, the external world, matter) are recognized as identical with sensations, for this is nothing more than Berkeleyanism. There is no trace of any new, positive philosophy or undoubted fact here; it is just old, old idealistic sophistry. And if you ask Bogdanov how he can prove this “undoubted fact” that the physical is identical with sensations, then you will not hear a single argument except the eternal refrain of idealists: I feel only my sensations; “evidence of self-consciousness” (die Aussage des Selbstbewußtseins - in Avenarius in “Prolegomena”, p. 56 of the second German ed., §93); or: “in our experience” (which says that “we are sentient substances”) “sensation is given to us more reliably than substantiality” (ibid., p. 55, §91), etc., etc., and so on. For an “undoubted fact” Bogdanov accepted (by trusting Mach) a reactionary philosophical twist, because in fact not a single fact was given and cannot be given that would refute the view of sensation as an image of the external world - a view shared by Bogdanov in 1899 year and shared by natural science at its time. The physicist Mach, in his philosophical wanderings, went completely away from “modern natural science” - we will have to talk a lot about this important circumstance, not noticed by Bogdanov.

One of the circumstances that helped Bogdanov so quickly jump from the materialism of natural scientists to the confused idealism of Mach was (in addition to the influence of Ostwald) Avenarius’s doctrine of the dependent and independent series of experience. Bogdanov himself, in Book I of Empiriomonism, puts the matter this way:

"Since the data of experience appear depending on the state of a given nervous system, insofar as they form psychic world given person; since the experimental data are taken without such dependence, to the extent that it is before us physical world. Therefore, Avenarius designates these two areas of experience as dependent series And independent series experience" (p. 18).

That's the trouble, that this doctrine of independent(from a person’s sensation) “next” is a pushing through of materialism, illegal, arbitrary, eclectic from the point of view of philosophy, which says that bodies are Complexes of sensations, that sensations are “identical” with the “elements” of the physical. For once you have recognized that the source of light and light waves exist regardless from a person and from human consciousness, color depends on the action of these waves on the retina - then you have actually taken a materialistic point of view and destroyed to the ground all the “undoubted facts” of idealism with all the “complexes of sensations”, elements discovered by the latest positivism, and similar nonsense.

The trouble is that Bogdanov (together with all the Russian Machists) did not delve into the initial idealistic views of Mach and Avenarius, did not understand their basic idealistic premises - and therefore overlooked the illegality and eclecticism of their subsequent attempt to smuggle in materialism. Meanwhile, as much as the initial idealism of Mach and Avenarius is generally recognized in philosophical literature, it is equally generally accepted that subsequently empirio-criticism tried to turn towards materialism. The French writer Covelart, quoted above, sees “monistic idealism” in Avenarius’s “Prolegomena”, “absolute realism” in “Critique of Pure Experience” (1888-1890), and “absolute realism” in “The Human Concept of the World” (1891) - an attempt explanations for this change. Note that the term realism is used here in the sense of the opposite of idealism. Following Engels, I use in this sense only word: materialism, and I consider this terminology to be the only correct one, especially in view of the fact that the word “realism” has been hijacked by positivists and other confused people who waver between materialism and idealism. Here it is enough to note that Kovelart is referring to the undoubted fact that in “Prolegomena” (1876) for Avenarius, sensation is the only thing that exists, while “substance” is based on the principle of “economy of thought”! – eliminated, and in the “Critique of Pure Experience” the physical is taken for independent row, the mental, and therefore the sensations, are dependent.

Avenarius’s student Rudolf Willi also admits that Avenarius, who was “entirely” an idealist in 1876, subsequently “reconciled” (Ausgleich) “naive realism” with this teaching (quoted above essay, ibid.) - i.e. that spontaneously, unconsciously materialistic point of view on which humanity stands, accepting the existence of the external world independently of our consciousness.

Oscar Ewald, the author of a book about “Avenarius as the founder of empirio-criticism,” says that this philosophy combines contradictory idealistic and “realistic” (one should have said: materialistic) elements (not in the Machian, but in the human meaning of the word: element). For example, “an absolute (consideration) would perpetuate naive realism, a relative one would declare exclusive idealism permanent.”* Avenarius calls absolute consideration what corresponds in Mach to the connection of “elements” outside our body, and relative what corresponds to Mach’s connection “ elements" dependent on our body.

* Oshar Ewald,"Richard Avenarius als Begründer des Empiriokritizismus", Brl., 1905, S. 66 ( Oscar Ewald."Richard Avenarius as the founder of empirio-criticism", Berlin, 1905, p. 66. Ed.).

But what is especially interesting for us in this regard is the review of Wundt, who himself, like most of the above-mentioned writers, takes a confused idealistic point of view, but who, perhaps, analyzed empirio-criticism more carefully than anyone else. P. Yushkevich says the following about this: “It is curious that Wundt considers empirio-criticism to be the most scientific form of the last type of materialism,” * i.e. that type of materialist who sees the spiritual as a function of bodily processes (and whom – let us add – Wundt calls standing in the middle between Spinozism 18 and absolute materialism**).

** P. Yushkevich. "Materialism and critical realism", St. Petersburg, 1908, p. 15.

*** W.Wundt."Über naiven und kritischen Realismus" in "Philosophische Studien" 19, Bd. XIII, 1897, S. 334 ( W. Wundt."On Naive and Critical Realism" in Philosophical Studies, vol. XIII, 1897, p. 334. Ed.).

It is true that W. Wundt's review is extremely interesting. But what is most “curious” here is how Mr. Yushkevich relates to those books and articles on philosophy that he treats. This is a typical example of the attitude of our Machists to their work. Gogol's Petrushka read and found it interesting that words always come out of letters. Mr. Yushkevich read Wundt and found it “curious” that Wundt accused Avenarius of materialism. If Wundt is wrong, why not refute it? If he is right, why not explain the opposition of materialism to empirio-criticism? Mr. Yushkevich finds “curious” what the idealist Wundt says, but this Machian considers understanding the matter completely unnecessary work (probably due to the principle of “economy of thought”)...

The fact is that, having informed the reader of Wundt’s accusation of Avenarius in materialism and keeping silent about the fact that Wundt considers some aspects of empirio-criticism to be materialism, others - idealism, and the connection between the two is artificial - Yushkevich completely distorted the matter. Either this gentleman absolutely does not understand what he is reading, or he was driven by the desire to falsely praise himself through Wundt: the government professors also consider us not some kind of confusion, but materialists.

The named article by Wundt is a large book (over 300 pages) devoted to a detailed analysis, first of the immanent school, then of the empirio-critics. Why did Wundt connect these two schools? Because he counts them close relatives,- and this opinion, shared by Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and the immanentists, is certainly correct, as we will see below. Wundt shows in the first part of this article that immanentists are idealists, subjectivists, supporters of fideism. This again, as we will see below, is a completely fair opinion, expressed only by Wundt with the unnecessary ballast of professorial erudition, with unnecessary subtleties and reservations, explained by the fact that Wundt himself is an idealist and fideist. He reproaches the immanentists not because they are idealists and supporters of fideism, but because, in his opinion, they incorrectly derive these great principles. Further, Wundt devotes the second and third parts of the article to empirio-criticism. At the same time, he quite clearly points out that the very important theoretical provisions of empirio-criticism (the understanding of “experience” and “principled coordination”, which we will discuss below) are identical he has with immanents (die empiriokritische in Übereinstimmung mit der immanenten Philosophic annimmt, S. 382 of Wundt’s articles). Other theoretical positions of Avenarius are borrowed from materialism, and in general, empirio-criticism is "variegated mixture"(bunte Mischung, S. 57 of the said article), in which “the various constituent parts completely unrelated to each other" (an sich einander völlig heterogen sind, p. 56).

Among the materialist pieces of the Avenarius-Mach mishmash, Wundt includes mainly the former’s doctrine of "independent life series". If you start from “system C” (as Avenarius, a great lover of the scientific game of new terms, designates the human brain or the nervous system in general), if the mental for you is a function of the brain, then this “system C” is a “metaphysical substance” , says Wundt (p. 64 of the named article), and your teaching is materialism. Metaphysicians, I must say, are called names; materialists, many idealists and all agnostics (Kantians and Humeans included), because it seems to them that the recognition of the existence of an external world independent of human consciousness is a way out of the limits of experience. We will talk about this terminology and its complete incorrectness from the point of view of Marxism in its proper place. Now it is important for us to note that it is precisely the assumption of an “independent” series that Avenarius (and likewise Mach, in other words expressing the same idea) has - as is generally recognized by philosophers of different parties, i.e. different directions in philosophy - borrowing from materialism. If you proceed from the fact that everything that exists is sensation or that bodies are complexes of sensations, then you cannot, without destroying all your basic premises, all “your” philosophy, come to the conclusion that regardless exists from our consciousness physical and what a feeling there is function matter organized in a certain way. Mach and Avenarius combine in their philosophy the main idealistic premises and individual materialist conclusions precisely for this reason. That their theory is an example of that “eclectic beggarly stew” 20 about which Engels spoke with deserved contempt.*

* Preface to "Ludwig Feuerbach", marked February 1888. These words of Engels apply to German professorial philosophy in general. Machists who want to be Marxists, not being able to think about the meaning and content of this thought of Engels, sometimes hide behind the pathetic excuse: “Engels did not yet know Mach” (Fritz Adler in "Historical materialism" p. 370). What is this opinion based on? On the fact that Engels does not quote Mach and Avenarius? There are no other grounds, but this ground is unsuitable, because Engels no one does not name one of the eclecticists by name, and Engels could hardly not have known Avenarius, who since 1876 published a three-monthly volume of “scientific” philosophy.

In Mach's last philosophical work, Knowledge and Delusion, 2nd ed., 1906, this eclecticism is especially striking. We have already seen that Mach states there:

“there is no difficulty in constructing any physical element from sensations, i.e. mental elements,” and in the same book we read: “Dependencies outside U (= Umgrenzung, i.e. “spatial boundary of our body,” Seite 8) are physics in the broadest sense" (S. 323, §4). “In order to obtain these dependencies in a pure form (rein erhalten), it is necessary, if possible, to exclude the influence of the observer, i.e., the elements lying inside U” (ibid.).

So. So. At first, the tit promised to set the sea on fire, i.e. build physical elements from mental ones, and then it turned out that the physical elements lie outside the boundary of the mental elements “lying inside our body”! Philosophy, nothing to say!

Another example:

“A perfect (ideal, vollkommenes) gas, a perfect liquid, a perfect elastic body does not exist; the physicist knows that his fictions only approximately correspond to the facts, arbitrarily simplifying them; he is aware of this deviation, which cannot be eliminated” (S. 418, §thirty).

What deviation (Abweichung) is being referred to here? Deviation of what from what? Thoughts (physical theory) from facts. What are thoughts, ideas? Ideas are “traces of sensations” (S. 9). What are facts? Facts are “complexes of sensations”; Thus, the deviation of traces of sensations from complexes of sensations cannot be eliminated.

What does it mean? This means that Mach forgets his own theory and, starting to talk about various issues of physics, argues simply, without idealistic frills, i.e. materialistically. All “complexes of sensations” and all this Berkeleyan wisdom fly away. The theory of physicists turns out to be a reflection of bodies, liquids, and gases that exist outside of us and independently of us, and this reflection, of course, is approximate, but it is wrong to call this approximation or simplification “arbitrary.” Feeling in practice is considered here by Mach exactly as it is considered by all natural science, not “purified” by the students of Berkeley and Hume, i.e. How image of the outside world. Mach's own theory is subjective idealism, and when a moment of objectivity is needed, Mach without hesitation inserts into his reasoning premises the opposite, i.e. materialist theory of knowledge. Consistent idealist and consistent reactionary in philosophy Eduard Hartmann, sympathetic to the Machist struggle against materialism, comes very close to the truth when he says that Mach's philosophical position is “a mixture (Nichtunterscheidung) of naive realism and absolute illusionism.”* This is true. The doctrine that bodies are complexes of sensations, etc., is absolute illusionism, i.e. solipsism, because from this point of view the whole world is nothing more than my illusion. The reasoning we have cited by Mach, like a whole series of his other fragmentary reasonings, is the so-called “naive realism”, i.e. unconsciously, spontaneously adopted from natural scientists the materialist theory of knowledge.

* Eduard von Hartmann."Die Weltanschauung der modernen Physik", Lpz., 1902, S. 219 ( Eduard von, Hartmann."The Worldview of Modern Physics", Leipzig, 1902, p. 219. Ed.).

Avenarius and the professors following in his footsteps are trying to cover up this confusion with the theory of “principled coordination.” We will now move on to its consideration, but first we will finish with the question of accusing Avenarius of materialism. Mr. Yushkevich, who seemed curious about Wundt’s review that he did not understand, was not curious to find out himself or did not deign to inform the reader how Avenarius’s closest students and successors reacted to this accusation. Meanwhile, this is necessary to clarify the matter if we are interested in the question of the relationship between Marx’s philosophy, i.e. materialism, to the philosophy of empirio-criticism. And then, if Machism is a confusion, a confusion of materialism with idealism, then it is important to know where - so to speak - this trend was drawn when the official idealists began to push it away for making concessions to materialism.

Wundt was answered, by the way, by two of the purest and most orthodox students of Avenarius, I. Petzoldt and Fr. Carstanien. Petzoldt with proud indignation rejected the accusation of materialism that disgraces the German professor and referred to... what would you think?.. to Avenarius's Prolegomena, where the concept of substance was allegedly destroyed! A convenient theory when one can attribute to it both purely idealistic works and arbitrarily assumed materialistic premises! Avenarius's "Critique of Pure Experience", of course, does not contradict this teaching - i.e. materialism,” wrote Petzoldt, “but it just as little contradicts the directly opposite, spiritualistic teaching.* Excellent defense! Engels called this an eclectic beggar's stew. Bogdanov, who does not want to admit that he is a Machist and who wants to be recognized ( in philosophy) Marxist, follows Petzoldt. He believes that “empirio-criticism has nothing... to do with materialism, or spiritualism, or any metaphysics in general,”** that “the truth... is not in the “golden mean” between the clashing directions” (materialism and spiritualism), “and outside of both of them.”*** In fact, what seemed to Bogdanov to be the truth is confusion, vacillation between materialism and idealism.

* J.Petzoldt."Einführung in die Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung", Bd. I, S. 351, 352.

** "Empiriomonism", book. I, ed. 2nd, p. 21.

*** Ibid., p. 93.

Carstanjen, objecting to Wundt, wrote that he completely rejected “the slipping in (Unterschiebung) of the materialist moment,” “which is completely alien to the criticism of pure experience.”* “Empirio-criticism is skepticism κατ”εξoχηυ (primarily) in relation to the content of concepts.” A piece of truth there is in this strengthened emphasis on the neutrality of Machism: the amendment of Mach and Avenarius to their original idealism is entirely reduced to the assumption of half-hearted concessions to materialism.Instead of Berkeley's consistent point of view: the external world is my sensation - sometimes we get Hume's point of view: I eliminate the question of whether there is something behind my feelings.And this point of view of agnosticism inevitably condemns oscillations between materialism and idealism.

* Fr. Carstanjen."Der Empiriokritizismus, zugleich eine Erwiderung auf W.Wundt"s Aufsätze", "Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie", Jahrg. 22 (1898), SS. 73 and 213 ( Fr. Carstanjen."Empirio-criticism, at the same time - a response to the articles of W. Wundt", "Three months of Scientific Philosophy", 22nd year of publication.., (1898), pp. 73 and 213. Ed.).

3. PRINCIPLE COORDINATION AND “NAIVE REALISM”

Avenarius’s teaching on fundamental coordination is set out by him in “The Human Concept of the World” and in “Remarks”. These latter were written later, and Avenarius emphasizes here that he sets out, although somewhat differently, not anything different from the “Critique of Frequent Experience” and “The Human Concept of the World,” but the same(“Bemerk.”* 1894, S. 137 in the cited journal). The essence of this doctrine is the provision about "inextricable(unauflösliche) coordination"(i.e. correlative connection) "our Self(des Ich) and environment"(S. 146). “Philosophically speaking,” Avenarius says immediately, “one can say: “ I And not me"". Both and ours I and Wednesday, we "Always we find together" (immer ein Zusammen-Vorgefundenes).

"No complete description of this (or found

Makhachkala - 2009

MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND SR RF

STATE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION OF HIGHER PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

DAGESTAN STATE

MEDICAL ACADEMY

DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY

Kafarov T.E.

Khalikov A.S.

PHILOSOPHY IN TESTS

Educational and methodological manual

Recommended by the Scientific and Methodological Council on Philosophy of the Ministry of Education and Science of Russia as an educational and methodological manual in the discipline “Philosophy” for students of natural science and technical specialties and areas of training. (dated 05/29/2006 No. 80/3).

Makhachkala - 2009

BBK 87

Compiled by: Doctor of Philosophy, Head. Department of Philosophy and History of the DSMA Kafarov Telman Emiralievich

Candidate of Philosophy, Associate Professor of the Department of Philosophy and History of the DSMA Khalikov Abdulkhalik Sultansaidovich

Reviewer: Aliev N.I.– Doctor of Philosophy, Head of the Department of Humanitarian Disciplines of the DSMA.

PHILOSOPHY IN TESTS

Educational and methodological manual. Makhachkala, 2009, 113 p.

The manual is compiled on the basis of the curriculum in accordance with state standards in the humanities. All sections of the philosophy course are covered, taking into account the regional component and medical profile. The publication can be used in the process of teaching philosophy at universities as a control and educational tool to optimize the educational process. The work is provided with answers to tasks, which allows it to be used for self-study and can be adapted to modern educational technologies.

Makhachkala - 2009

Preface

In the educational process, various techniques and methods, forms and means are used to promote the active work of students and the disclosure of their creative potential. One of these forms is testing, which has been actively used in our education system in recent years. The attitude towards this form of consolidation and control of knowledge on the part of teachers is far from unambiguous. We believe that testing should not be considered as a self-sufficient means of learning and control over knowledge. In theoretical, and especially philosophical disciplines, tests lead to formalization, simplification of the material, and its superficial assimilation. In our opinion, tests are good as one of the levels (stages) of control and consolidation of control of educational material. This manual is compiled on the basis of the curriculum, taking into account the regional component and is the result of a generalization of the experience of teaching a philosophy course at the Dagestan State Medical Academy and the Makhachkala branch of the Moscow Automobile and Highway Institute (State Technical University); approbation of the method of testing and solving logical problems as a productive form in the development of creative abilities of undergraduate and graduate students. The test tasks of the manual are of a control-learning nature: for many problems of philosophy, students will find acceptable answers, and the teacher will receive additional material to enhance the mental activity of students and the opportunity to test and control knowledge in the process of ongoing study and final control. In this case, various options are offered: in some cases you need to choose the only correct answer to 3-5 positions, in others you need to indicate the most suitable of the proposed positions, in others you need to indicate the wrong option. The search for the correct answer can be carried out either by intuitive choice or by contradiction, i.e. preliminary exclusion of options that do not correspond to the true answer. In any case, subsequent logical justification and commentary on the selected option is necessary. The varying degrees of complexity of the test tasks presented will allow us to differentiate the process of learning and monitoring the knowledge of undergraduate and graduate students, taking into account their level of preparation. When compiling the tests, textbooks on philosophy were used, as well as reference books and other publications containing test tasks. The proposed edition contains more than 1000 tests and represents an expanded and improved version of the 2006 edition. We count on critical comments, recommendations and wishes of our colleagues, which will be taken into account in further work.

I. Philosophy as a worldview, the main range of problems

? The term philosophy was first used by:

Heraclitus;

Democritus;

Pythagoras;

Aristotle;

How do philosophy and worldview relate:

Philosophy is part of the worldview;

Philosophy is the theoretical core of the worldview;

Worldview is part of philosophy;

Philosophy is the rational-theoretical basis of a worldview;

Philosophy has nothing to do with worldview.

In what regions of the world did philosophy originate?

Greece;

Name the representatives of philosophical idealism:

K. Marx;

Democritus;

Plato;

G. Hegel;

D. Berkeley.

Who believed that philosophy begins with wonder?

Plato;

Aristotle;

G. Hegel;

K. Marx.

? Main features of philosophical thinking:

Subjectivity;

Reflexivity;

Integrity;

Specificity;

Criticality.

? The structure of any worldview, according to V. Dilthey, includes:

Picture of the world;

Beliefs;

Ideals;

Life assessment;

Political ideas.

? I. Kant outlined the sphere of philosophy with the following questions (specify the odd one):

What can I know;

What should I do;

What is nature;

What is a person?

What can I hope for?

? What unites the mythological and religious types of worldview?

Sensory-figurative form of mastering reality;

Abstract-conceptual form of mastering reality;

Theoretical and practical mastery of the surrounding reality;

Analytical way of understanding the world;

All answers are correct.

? Materialism is:

Proclamation of the priority of sensual pleasures;

All answers are correct

? The world is a complex of sensations, they believe:

Materialists;

Objective idealists;

Subjective idealists;

Pantheism;

All named.

? What role does “axiology” play in philosophical teachings?

This is a teaching about values;

This is a theory about the motivation of behavior;

This is a doctrine of universally valid values;

This is a normative discipline;

Everything mentioned.

? The difference between mentality and worldview is that mentality:

Formed on an unconscious level;

Exists exclusively in the realm of the rational;

It is synonymous only with value orientations;

Associated only with beliefs;

Everything listed.

? Mythology is historically closest to:

Philosophy;

Religions;

Art.

?Philosophy is primarily aimed at understanding:

Worldview issues;

Natural processes;

Social problems;

Economic problems;

Universal problems.

? The set of views, assessments, norms and attitudes that determine a person’s relationship to the world is:

Worldview;

Hypothesis;

Inference;

Problem.

The emergence of philosophy meant:

The emergence of abstract knowledge, avoidance of worldly problems, refusal of active activity;

The emergence of a new social class in society;

Further evolution of mythology and religion, their synthesis based on knowledge of natural

processes;

The transition of people to independent reflection about the world, about human destiny, the desire to find the truth;

Everything listed.

The uniqueness of philosophy lies in the fact that it:

It has universality and extreme abstraction;

Explores how the processes of reality are studied, is the result of the self-awareness of science;

Relies on provisions that do not require proof or justification;

Forms people’s value orientations and their attitude towards the world around them;

Based on observation and experiment.

Philosophers, according to Pythagoras, are people:

Able to argue;

Able to listen;

Seeking knowledge;

Those who strive for knowledge and the right way of life;

Everything listed.

? The philosophical worldview is characterized by:

Visibility;

Empirical validity;

Systematicity;

All of the above signs.

? In every society there is:

There are as many worldviews as there are people;

One worldview;

Different types of worldviews;

How many peoples, so many worldviews;

There are as many faiths (religions) as there are worldviews.

?The forms of pre-philosophical worldview are:

Mythology;

Religion;

Art;

? Human can:

Have a non-philosophical worldview;

Have several worldviews at the same time;

Have only a scientific worldview;

Have no worldview;

Everything listed.

? Philosophy studies (the most suitable option):

The world at large;

The world as a whole;

Separate aspects of life;

Society and its problems;

Political processes in society.

? In myths, people tried to give answers to troubling questions in the form:

Legends;

Legends;

Fictions;

Analysis;

Proof.

? Religion and philosophy are components of the spiritual culture of humanity:

They have nothing in common with each other;

They differ in form, but are the same in content;

They deal with general ideological questions (problems), but mostly give different answers to them;

They are forms of social consciousness.

? The division of the world into otherworldly and thisworldly is characteristic of:

! philosophy;

Religions;

Arts;

Everything listed.

? Religion imparts moral values:

Absolute character;

Conditional nature;

Neutral character;

Sacred character;

Independent character.

? What brings philosophy and science together:

Abstract thinking;

Use of logic;

Conducting experiments;

Implementation of results into production;

Everything listed.

? According to Aristotle, the doctrine of the first causes, the general principles of being, is called:

Philosophy;

Physics;

Metaphysics;

Logic;

Ontology.

Which of the judgments focuses attention on the value aspect of the philosophical worldview:

Philosophy is a method of theoretical exploration of reality, aimed at comprehending the essence of being;

Philosophy is a form of spiritual and practical mastery of reality, an expression of human attitude towards the world;

Philosophy is a system of abstract knowledge about the world that is not related to everyday human life;

Philosophy is the love of wisdom;

Everything listed.

Philosophy differs from religion:

As a branch of culture in which reason and logic predominate, but faith also takes place in it;

As an area of ​​spiritual activity in which faith is more important than reason, although reason is used to justify faith;

As a form of culture in which knowledge itself is an object of faith and is based on the authority of tradition;

As a field of knowledge of a historical nature;

Everything listed.

On the issue of the sources of philosophy, there are the following basic concepts:

Mythogenic;

Scientistic;

Gnoseomythogenic;

Anthropological;

Naturalistic.

Philosophy arises and exists for quite a long time in the form:

Mythologies;

Pre-philosophy;

Mystics;

Paganism;

Everything listed.

? Which questions are philosophical?

What are the ways to prevent nuclear war?

How to solve the food problem?

What is freedom?

When did people appear on earth?

What is a sense of life?

? The correct statement is:

There is a single philosophy of humanity;

Each state has its own philosophy, which reflects its history;

The development of human culture is accompanied by the emergence of various

philosophical schools, directions and concepts;

Philosophy acts as the self-consciousness of the era;

Philosophy arises in periods of crisis in society.

? The most appropriate judgment:

Philosophy has nothing to do with private sciences (medicine);

It acts as the theoretical basis of special sciences;

Philosophy includes special sciences;

Philosophy generalizes private scientific knowledge.

? A philosopher is a person (the most suitable option):

Possessor of truth;

Able to argue;

Capable of conducting experiments;

Seeking the search for truth;

Everything listed.

? According to Hegel, philosophy is an era captured in:

Nature;

Society;

Art;

Thoughts and art.

? Problems discussed in philosophy concern:

Scientists, researchers;

Statesmen and politicians;

Each person;

Believers;

That's right.

? At its core, philosophy begins with the question: what is:

! true;

Nature;

Human;

The beginning of all things.

? Worldview questions:

! characteristic of religion and philosophy;

Considered only within the framework of philosophy;

Not related to philosophy;

Philosophy has its own approach to solving these issues;

They are considered not only within the framework of philosophy.

? The cult system is the main element:

Philosophy;

Arts;

Mythologies;

Religions.

Philosophy originates as an attempt to solve basic ideological problems with the help of:

Characters;

Images;

Reason;

Everything listed.

? “The words of that philosopher are empty, who do not heal any human suffering, just as there is no benefit from medicine if it does not expel diseases from the body, so there is no benefit from philosophy if it does not expel diseases of the soul.” This is how he defined the task of philosophy:

Epicurus;

Aristotle.

? Philosophy, according to Hippocrates, is an activity that deals with:

Understanding God;

Fundamental theoretical thought;

Sensory perception of reality;

An experiment;

With everything mentioned.

Russian thinker who defined philosophy as the creative awareness by the spirit of the meaning of human existence:

Soloviev;

L. Tolstoy;

Berdyaev;

Bulgakov.

The functions performed by philosophy do not include:

Pragmatic;

Methodological;

Epistemological;

Worldview;

Prognostic

Please indicate the correct answer. Philosophy is:

The same science as history, political science, sociology;

Ability to conduct a conversation;

It is a form of worldview that is grounded in science and reason;

This is a religion where: the place of God is taken by an abstract concept;

! "science of sciences", which includes all other sciences.

? A characteristic feature of philosophical reflection is:

Doubt;

Brevity;

Evidence;

Logic.

? A distinctive feature of philosophical methods is their:

Accuracy;

Specifics;

Versatility;

Consistency;

Subject matter.

? The cognitive-intellectual side of the worldview is:

Attitude;

Worldview;

Worldview;

Worldview;

Everything listed.

? The emotional and psychological side of the worldview at the level of moods and feelings is:

Worldview;

Attitude;

Judgment;

Inference;

Concept.

According to Hippocrates, a physician-philosopher is like:

To the sage;

Spiritual mentor;

All mentioned.

Which of the following concepts belong to philosophical categories:

Gravity;

Molecule;

Elementary particle;

Substance;

Cause.

The idea of ​​philosophy as the “mistress”, “queen” of the sciences developed in:

Ancient era;

In the Middle Age;

Renaissance;

New Time;

The Age of Enlightenment.

Materialism is:

The principle of philosophical research;

The doctrine of the materiality of the world;

Proclamation of priority, sensual pleasures;

A philosophical movement that asserts the primacy of matter;

Everything listed.

Which of the following statements corresponds to idealism?

Consciousness is a product of matter;

Consciousness is inextricably linked with matter;

Consciousness can exist before and independently of matter;

Consciousness does not always adequately reflect matter;

Everything listed.

Representatives of objective idealism are:

Voltaire;

Plato;

Hegel.

One of the historical types of worldview (indicate which option is not suitable):

Mythological;

Religious;

Philosophical;

Scientific;

Psychological.

The philosophy of medicine is:

Mental Cognition Theory of Health and Disease;

Theoretical basis of modern medicine;

Correct diagnosis;

Conducting a medical experiment.

Medicine refers to the following type of knowledge:

Natural science;

Humanitarian;

Technical;

Natural science and socio-humanitarian;

Interdisciplinary.

What ontological contradiction is expressed by the medical category “pre-disease”:

Contradiction between organism and environment;

The contradiction of being actual and potential;

Contradiction between subjective and objective;

The contradiction between the general and the individual;

The contradiction between man and nature.

The basic premises of the theory of knowledge of Mach and Avenarius were frankly, simply and clearly stated by them in their first philosophical works. We will turn to these works, postponing until further presentation the analysis of the amendments and erasures subsequently given by these writers.

“The task of science,” Mach said in 1872, “can consist solely in the following: 1. To study the laws of connection between perceptions (psychology) - 2. To discover the laws of connection between sensations (physics) - 3. To explain the laws of connection between sensations and ideas ( psychophysics)".<<*13>> This is quite clear.

The subject of physics is the connection between sensations, and not between things or bodies, the image of which will be our sensations. And in 1883, in his “Mechanics,” Mach repeats the same idea: “Sensations are not “symbols of things.” Rather, a “thing” is a mental symbol for a complex of sensations that has relative stability. Not things (bodies), but colors, sounds, pressures, spaces, times (what we usually call sensations) are the real elements of the world."<<*14>>

We will talk about this word “elements,” which was the fruit of twelve years of “reflection,” below. Let us note that now we must note that Mach admits here directly that things or bodies are complexes of sensations, and that he quite clearly contrasts this philosophical point of view with the opposite theory, according to which sensations are “symbols” of things (more precisely, images or display of things) By the way, this last theory is philosophical materialism. For example, the materialist Friedrich Engels - a well-known collaborator of Marx and the founder of Marxism - constantly and without exception speaks in his writings about things and about their mental images or reflections (Gedanken-Abbilder), and it is self-evident that these mental images do not arise otherwise as from sensations. It would seem that this basic view of the “philosophy of Marxism” should be known to everyone who speaks about it, and especially to everyone who speaks in print on behalf of this philosophy. But in view of the extraordinary confusion introduced by our Machians, we have to repeat what is generally known. We open the first paragraph of “Anti-Dühring” and read: “...things and their mental representations...”.<<*15>> Or the first paragraph of the philosophical section: “Where does thinking get these principles from?” (we are talking about the basic principles of all knowledge) “From itself? No... Thinking can never draw and derive forms of being from itself, but only from the external world... Principles are not the starting point of research” (as it turns out from Dühring, who wants to be a materialist, but does not know how to consistently implement materialism), “and his final result; these principles are not applied to nature and human history, but are abstracted from them; it is not nature, not humanity that conforms to the principles, but, on the contrary, the principles are true exclusively insofar as they correspond to nature and history. This is the only materialist view of the subject, and Dühring’s opposite view is an idealist view, turning the real relationship upside down, constructing the real world from thoughts "... (ibid., S. 21)<<#24>> And Engels pursues, we repeat, everywhere and without exception, the “only materialist view,” mercilessly persecuting Dühring for the slightest deviation from materialism to idealism. Anyone who reads Anti-Dühring and Ludwig Feuerbach with a little attention will come across dozens of examples where Engels talks about things and their images in the human head, in our consciousness, thinking, etc. Engels does not say that sensations or ideas are “symbols” of things, since consistent materialism must put “images”, pictures or representations here in place of the “symbol”, as we will show in detail in this place. But now we are talking not at all about this or that formulation of materialism, but about the opposition of materialism to idealism, about the difference between the two main lines in philosophy. Should we go from things to sensations and thoughts? Or from thoughts and sensations to things? Engels adheres to the first, that is, materialist, line. The second, i.e. idealistic, line is followed by Mach. No subterfuge, no sophistry (of which we will meet many more) will not eliminate the clear and indisputable fact that E. Mach’s teaching about things as complexes of sensations is subjective idealism, is a simple repetition of Berkeleyism. If bodies are “complexes of sensations,” as Mach says, or “combinations of sensations,” as Berkeley said, then it inevitably follows that the whole world is only my idea. Based on such a premise, it is impossible to come to the existence of other people except oneself: this is pure solipsism. No matter how much Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt and Co. renounce it, in fact they cannot get rid of solipsism without blatant logical absurdities. To explain even more clearly the main element of the philosophy of Machism, we will cite some additional quotes from Mach’s works. Here is a sample from “Analysis of Sensations” (Russian translation by Kotlyar, published by Skirmunt. M., 1907):

"Before us is a body with a point S. When we touch the point, bring it into contact with our body, we get a prick. We can see the point without feeling the prick. But when we feel the prick, we will find the point. Based on all that has been said above , we come to the conclusion that the visible tip is a permanent core, and the prick is something random, which, depending on the circumstances, may not be associated with the core. With the increase in similar phenomena, we finally get used to considering all the properties of bodies as “actions” "emanating from such permanent nuclei and produced on our I through the medium of our body - "actions", which we call "sensations"..." (p. 20)

In other words: people “get used” to taking the point of view of materialism, to consider sensations as the result of the action of bodies, things, nature on our senses. By the way, Mach does not like this “habit”, which is harmful for philosophical idealists (instilled by all of humanity and all of natural science!), and he begins to destroy it:

"...But to the core data, the data loses all its sensory content, becoming bare abstract symbols"...

Old honk, most venerable professor! This is a literal repetition of Berkeley, who said that matter is a naked abstract symbol. But Ernst Mach actually walks naked, because if he does not recognize that the “sensual content” will be an objective reality existing independently of us, then he is left with one “naked abstract” I, certainly a large and italic-written I == "a crazy piano that imagined that it alone existed in the world." If the “sensory content” of our sensations is not the external world, then nothing exists except this naked self, engaged in empty “philosophical” tricks. A stupid and fruitless endeavor!

"...Then it is true that the world consists only of our sensations. But then we only know our sensations, and the assumption of those nuclei, as well as the interaction between them, the fruit of which will be exclusively sensations, turns out to be completely idle and unnecessary. Such a view may be good only for half-hearted realism or half-hearted criticism."

We have recited the entire 6th paragraph of Mach's "anti-metaphysical remarks". This is complete plagiarism from Berkeley. Not a single consideration, not a single glimmer of thought, except that “we feel only ϲʙᴏsensations.” There is only one conclusion from this, namely, that “the world consists only of my sensations.” The word “ours”, put by Mach, instead of the word “mine”, was put by him illegally. It is important to note that with one given word Mach already reveals that very “half-heartedness” of which he accuses others. For if the “assumption” of the external world is “idle,” the assumption that the needle exists independently of me and that interaction occurs between my body and the tip of the needle, if the whole assumption is truly “idle and unnecessary,” then it is idle and unnecessary, first of all , the “assumption” of the existence of other people. Only I exist, and all other people, like the entire outside world, fall into the category of idle “nuclei”. It is impossible to talk about “our” sensations from this point of view, and since Mach speaks about them, then this only means his blatant half-heartedness. This exclusively proves that his philosophy is idle and empty words, which the author himself does not believe in.

Here is a particularly clear example of Mach's half-heartedness and confusion. In § 6 of Chapter XI of the same “Analysis of Sensations” we read: “If, while I sense something, I myself or someone else could observe my brain using all kinds of physical and chemical means , then it would be possible to determine with what processes occurring in the body a certain kind of sensation is associated..." (197)

Very good! This means that our sensations are connected with certain processes occurring in the body in general and in our brain in particular? Yes, Mach quite definitely makes an “assumption” - it would be wise not to make it from the position of natural science. But excuse me - after all, this is the very “assumption” of those very “nuclei and the interaction between them”, which our philosopher declared unnecessary and idle! Let us note that bodies, we are told, are complexes of sensations; to go further than this, Mach assures us, to consider sensations as the product of the action of bodies on our sense organs is metaphysics, an idle, unnecessary assumption, etc. according to Berkeley. But the brain is the body. This means that the brain is also nothing more than a complex of sensations. It turns out that with the help of a complex of sensations I (and I, too, am nothing more than a complex of sensations) feel complexes of sensations. What a beauty this philosophy is! First, declare sensations as “real elements of the world” and on this basis build an “original” Berkeleyanism, and then secretly smuggle in the opposite views that sensations are associated with certain processes in the body. Are these “processes” related to the metabolism between the “organism” and the outside world? Could this metabolism occur if the sensations of a given organism did not give it an objectively correct idea of ​​the external world?

Mach does not pose such inconvenient questions to himself, mechanically comparing scraps of Berkeleyanism with the views of natural science, which spontaneously stands on the point of view of the materialist theory of knowledge... “Sometimes they also ask the question,” writes Mach in the same paragraph, “whether “matter” does not also feel ( inorganic)"... So, there is no question that organic matter senses? This means that sensations are not something primary, but are one of the properties of matter? Mach jumps over all the absurdities of Berkeleyism!.. “This question,” he says, “is quite natural, if we proceed from ordinary, widespread physical concepts, according to which matter represents that immediate and undoubtedly given real, on which everything is built, as organic , and inorganic "... Let us remember well the truly valuable recognition of Mach that ordinary and widespread physical concepts consider matter to be an immediate reality, and only one type of this reality (organic matter) has a clearly expressed ability to feel..." After all, in this case, - Mach continues, - in a building consisting of matter, the sensation must arise somehow suddenly, or it must exist in the very, so to speak, foundation of the building. From our position, the question is fundamentally false. For us, matter is not the first datum. Such primary datum will rather be the elements (which in a certain certain sense are called sensations) "...

Thus, the primary data will be sensations, although they are “connected” only with certain processes in organic matter! And, speaking of such absurdity, Mach seems to blame materialism (“the usual, widespread physical concept”) for the unresolved question of where sensation “comes from.” This is an example of the “refutations” of materialism by fideists and their henchmen. Does any other philosophical point of view “solve” a question for which insufficient data have yet been collected? Doesn’t Mach himself say in the same paragraph: “as long as this problem (to decide “how far sensations extend in the organic world”) is not solved in any special case, it is impossible to solve this question”?

The difference between materialism and “Machism” goes, therefore, on this issue to the next one. Materialism, in full agreement with natural science, takes the given matter as the primary one, considering consciousness, thinking, sensation as secondary, since in a clearly expressed form sensation is associated only with the highest forms of matter (organic matter), and “in the foundation of the building of matter itself” one can exclusively assume the existence abilities similar to sensation. This is the assumption, for example, of the famous German naturalist Ernst Haeckel, the English biologist Lloyd Morgan and others, not to mention Diderot’s guess, which we cited above. Machism takes the opposite, idealistic point of view and immediately leads to nonsense, since, firstly, sensation is taken as primary despite the fact that it is associated exclusively with certain processes in matter organized in a certain way; and, secondly, the basic premise that bodies are complexes of sensations is violated by the assumption of the existence of other living beings and other “complexes” in general, besides this great Self.

The word “element”, which many naive people take (as we will see) for some kind of novelty and some kind of discovery, in fact only confuses the issue with a meaningless term, creates a false appearance of some kind of resolution or step forward. By the way, this appearance is false, since in fact it remains to be explored and explored how matter, which supposedly does not feel at all, is connected with matter, composed of the same atoms (or electrons) and at the same time possessing a clearly expressed ability to sense. Materialism clearly poses an as yet unresolved question and thereby pushes towards its resolution, pushes towards further experimental research. Machism, that is, a type of confused idealism, clogs the question and diverts it away from the right path through an empty verbal trick: “element.”

Here is one place in the last, bottom and final, philosophical work of Mach, showing all the falsity of this idealistic twist. In “Knowledge and Error” we read: “While there is no difficulty in constructing (aufzubauen) every physical element from sensations, that is, mental elements, it is impossible to imagine (ist keine Möglichkeit abzusehen) how one could imagine (darstellen ) any kind of mental experience from the elements used by modern physics, that is, from masses and movements (in that ossification - Starrheit - of these elements, which is convenient only for this special science)."<<*16>>

Engels speaks more than once with complete certainty about the ossification of concepts among many modern natural scientists, about their metaphysical (in the Marxist sense of the word, i.e., anti-dialectical) views. We will see below that Mach went crazy precisely at this point, not understanding, or not knowing, the relationship between relativism and dialectics. But now we are not talking about that. It is important for us to note here how clearly Mach’s idealism appears, despite the confused, supposedly new terminology. No, you see, there is no difficulty in constructing any physical element from sensations, i.e., mental elements! Oh, yes, such constructions, of course, are not difficult, for they are purely verbal constructions, empty scholasticism, serving to push through fideism. It is not surprising after this that Mach devotes his writings to immanentists, that immanentists, that is, supporters of the most reactionary philosophical idealism, rush to Mach’s neck. It is appropriate to note that the “newest positivism” of Ernst Mach was only two hundred years late: Berkeley has already sufficiently shown that it is impossible to “build” “out of sensations, that is, mental elements,” except solipsism. As for materialism, to which Mach contrasts his views here too, without naming the “enemy” directly and clearly, we have already seen the real views of materialists in the example of Diderot. These views do not consist in deriving sensation from the movement of matter or in approaching the movement of matter, but in the fact that sensation is recognized as one of the properties of moving matter. On this issue, Engels took Diderot's point of view.

From the “vulgar” materialists of Vocht,<<#25>>Buchner<<#26>> and Moleshotta<<#27>> Engels fenced himself off, by the way, precisely because they were confused by the idea that the brain secretes thought in the same way as the liver secretes bile. But Mach, who constantly opposes his views to materialism, ignores, of course, all the great materialists, Diderot, Feuerbach, and Marx-Engels, just like all the other government professors of government philosophy.

To characterize the initial and basic view of Avenarius, let us take his first independent philosophical work: “Philosophy as thinking about the world according to the principle of least waste of effort” (“Prolegomena to the Critique of Pure Experience”), published in 1876. Bogdanov in his “Empiriomonism” (Book I, ed. 2, 1905, p. 9, note) says that “in the development of Mach’s views, the starting point was philosophical idealism, while Avenarius was characterized from the very beginning by a realistic coloring.” Bogdanov said ϶ᴛᴏ because he took Mach’s word: see “Analysis of Sensations”, Russian. transl., p. 288. But Bogdanov believed Mach in vain, and his statement is diametrically opposed to the truth. On the contrary, Avenarius’ idealism appears so clearly in the aforementioned work of 1876 that Avenarius himself in 1891 was forced to admit it. In the preface to The Human Concept of the World, Avenarius says: “Whoever read my first systematic work, Philosophy, etc., will immediately assume that I should try to interpret the questions of the Critique of Pure Experience primarily from an idealistic point of view.” ("Der menschliche Weltbegriff", 1891, Vorwort, S. IX<<*17>>), but the “sterility of philosophical idealism” made me “doubt the correctness of my previous path” (S. X) In philosophical literature, this idealistic starting point of Avenarius is generally accepted; Among the French writers, I will refer to Kovelart, who says that in the Prolegomena the philosophical point of view of Avenarius is “monistic idealism”;<<*18>> of the German writers I will name Avenarius’s student Rudolf Willi, who says that “Avenarius in his youth - and especially in his work of 1876 - was completely under the spell (ganz im Banne) of so-called epistemological idealism.”<<*19>>

Yes, and it would be ridiculous to deny idealism in Avenarius’s “Prolegomena,” when he directly says there that “only sensation can be thought of as existing” (pp. 10 and 65 of the second German edition; italics in quotations are ours) This is how Avenarius himself puts it contents of § 116 of her work. Here is the paragraph in its entirety: “We have recognized that what exists (or: existing, das Seiende) is a substance endowed with sensation; substance disappears...” (“more economical,” you see, “less waste of effort” to think that there is no “substance” and no external world exists!) “...a sensation remains: existence should therefore be thought of as a sensation, at the basis of which there is nothing else alien to sensation” (nichts Empfindungsloses)

Thus, sensation exists without “substance”, i.e. thought exists without a brain! Are there really philosophers capable of defending this brainless philosophy? Eat. Among them is Professor Richard Avenarius. And in defending this, no matter how difficult it is for a healthy person to take it seriously, one has to stop a little. Here is Avenarius’s reasoning in §§ 89-90 of the same work:

"...The position that movement causes sensation is based on only apparent experience. This experience, a separate act of which will be perception, allegedly consists in the fact that sensation is generated in a certain kind of substance (the brain) as a result of transmitted movement (stimuli) and with the assistance of other material conditions (for example, blood) In this case - regardless of the fact that the generation was never directly (selbst) observed - in order to construct the supposed experience, as in all their parts, actual experience is extremely important in at least an empirical proof that the sensation allegedly caused in a certain substance by means of a transmitted motion did not previously exist in one way or another in that substance; so that the appearance of a sensation cannot be understood otherwise than through an act of creation on the part of a transmitted motion Thus, solely by proving that where there will now be a sensation, previously there was no sensation, even minimal, solely by this proof it would be possible to establish a fact which, meaning a certain act of creation, contradicts all other experience and radically changes everything the rest of the understanding of nature (Naturanschauung) But no experience gives such proof, and no experience can give it; on the contrary, the absolutely devoid of sensation state of the substance that subsequently senses is purely a hypothesis. And this hypothesis complicates and obscures our knowledge instead of simplifying and clarifying it.

“If the so-called experience, as if through a transmitted movement a sensation arises in a substance that begins to feel from that moment, turned out upon closer examination to be only apparent, then, perhaps, in the rest of the content of the experience there is still enough material to state at least the relative the origin of sensation from the conditions of movement, namely: to state that a sensation that is present, but hidden or minimal or for other reasons not amenable to our consciousness, due to the transmitted movement is liberated or increased, or becomes conscious. At the same time, this piece of the remaining content of experience there is only appearance. If we follow by ideal observation the movement emanating from the moving substance A, transmitted through a series of intermediate centers and reaching the sensation-endowed substance B, then we will find, at best, that the sensation in substance B develops or increases simultaneously with acceptance of the approaching movement, - but we will not find that this happened as a result of the movement "...

We deliberately recounted the full refutation of materialism by Avenarius, so that the reader could see what truly pathetic sophisms the “newest” empiriocritical philosophy operates with. We compare the materialist reasoning of... Bogdanov with the reasoning of the idealist Avenarius, at least as a punishment for him for betraying materialism!

In times long, long ago, nine whole years ago, when Bogdanov was half a “natural-historical materialist” (i.e., a supporter of the materialist theory of knowledge, on which the vast majority of modern natural scientists spontaneously stand), when Bogdanov was only half confused with sense of the confused Ostwald,<<#29>> Bogdanov narrated: “From ancient times and to this day, in descriptive psychology, the distinction between the facts of consciousness into three groups has been maintained: the area of ​​sensations and ideas, the area of ​​feelings, the area of ​​impulses... The first group includes images of phenomena of the external or internal world, taken in consciousness themselves... Such an image is called a “sensation” if it is directly caused through the organs of external senses by an external phenomenon that perceives it.”<<*20>> A little further: “a sensation... arises in consciousness as a result of some impulse from the external environment, transmitted through the external sense organs” (222) Or again: “Sensations form the basis of the life of consciousness, its direct connection with the outside world” ( 240) “At every step in the process of sensation there is a transition from the energy of external stimulation into the fact of consciousness” (133) And even in 1905, when Bogdanov managed, with the supportive assistance of Ostwald and Mach, to move from a materialist position in philosophy to an idealist one, he narrated ( due to forgetfulness!) in “Empiriomonism”: “As is known, the energy of external stimulation, transformed in the terminal apparatus of the nerve into an insufficiently studied, but alien to any mysticism, “telegraphic” form of nerve current, reaches primarily neurons located in the so-called “lower “centers - ganglionic, spinal, subcortical” (Book I, ed. 2, 1905, p. 118)

For any natural scientist who is not confused by professorial philosophy, as for any materialist, sensation is truly a direct connection between consciousness and the external world, it is the transformation of the energy of external stimulation into a fact of consciousness. Every person has observed this transformation millions of times and actually observes it at every step. The sophistry of idealistic philosophy essentially lies in the fact that sensation is taken not as a connection between consciousness and the external world, but as a partition, a wall separating consciousness from the external world - not as an image of the external phenomenon that gives sensation, but as the “only thing that exists.” Avenarius gave only a slightly modified form to this old sophism, worn out by Bishop Berkeley. Since we do not yet know all the conditions of the connection between sensation and a certain way organized matter that we observe every minute, we therefore recognize sensation alone as existing - this is where Avenarius’s sophism leads.

To finish characterizing the main idealistic premises of empirio-criticism, let us briefly point out the English and French representatives of this philosophical movement. About the Englishman Karl Pearson<<#30>> Mach directly says that he “agrees with his epistemological (erkenntniskritischen) views on all essential points” (“Mechanics”, op. cit., p. IX) K. Pearson, in turn, expresses the same agreement with Mach.<<*21>> For Pearson, “real things” are “sense impressions.” Pearson declares any recognition of things beyond sensory perceptions to be metaphysics. Pearson fights against materialism (not knowing either Feuerbach or Marx-Engels) in the most decisive way - the arguments do not differ from those discussed above. But Pearson is so alien to any desire to imitate materialism (the specialty of Russian Machists), Pearson is so... careless that, without inventing “new” nicknames for his philosophy, he simply announces the views of both Mach "idealistic" (p. 326 cit. ed.)! Pearson traces his ancestry directly back to Berkeley and Hume. Pearson's philosophy, as we will see repeatedly below, is distinguished by much greater integrity and thoughtfulness than Mach's philosophy.

With French physicists P. Duhem<<#31>> and Henri Poincaré<<#32>> Mach specifically expresses this solidarity.<<*22>> We will have to talk about the philosophical views of these writers, especially the confused and inconsistent ones, in the chapter on new physics. Here it is enough to note that for Poincaré things are “groups of sensations”<<*23>> and that Duhem also expresses a similar view in passing.<<*24>>

Let's move on to how Mach and Avenarius, recognizing the idealistic nature of their initial views, corrected them in their subsequent works.

Reviewers:

P.A.Romanov, Ph.D. Philosopher Associate Professor MarSU,

N.V.Klyukina, Ph.D. Philosopher Sciences, Associate Professor MOSU

Romanova S.A.

Philosophy: Tutorial. /Map. state univ. - Yoshkar-Ola, - 2007. - 92 s.

The textbook is written in accordance with the state standard for philosophy and contains basic information on topics, training tasks, screening tests, a list of basic and additional literature. The purpose of the manual is to help you study the philosophy course and prepare for successfully passing the exam.

The manual is intended for full-time, part-time and distance learning students, high school students and anyone interested in philosophical issues.

BBK 87 UDC1

i Romanova S.A., 2007

Section I

PHILOSOPHY AND ITS ROLEIN THE LIFE OF SOCIETY

The term "philosophy" translated from Greek means "love of wisdom" (phileo - Love, sophia - wisdom). This word was first explained by Pythagoras (VI-V centuries BC), who believed that life is like games: some come to compete, others to trade, and the happiest come to look at it all. For some, the goal is fame, for others - profit, and for others - the truth. Consequently, the meaning of philosophy, according to Pythagoras, is the search for truth.

The idea of ​​the essence of philosophy has changed over the course of history. Thus, for Aristotle, philosophy is knowledge of the general. In the Middle Ages, Seneca defined philosophy as the doctrine of morality and the correct understanding of people's place in the world. Kant believed that philosophy is the doctrine of the relation of human knowledge to the essential goals of human reason. And for Hegel, philosophy is a special way of thinking in concepts. The Russian philosopher V. Soloviev noted that philosophy is not only knowledge, but also moral improvement.

In philosophy, people look for answers to the main questions of their lives. They were formulated most clearly by the German philosopher I. Kant: What can I know? What should I do? What can I hope for? What is a person?

Philosophers have always strived to develop the most generalized knowledge about the world and man. That's why philosophy can be defined as a system of knowledge about the essential problems of existence, knowledge and man’s relationship to the world.

The uniqueness of philosophy is as follows:

It is universal and abstract.

Has a special reflexivity. It reflects spiritual (including cognitive) activity itself.

It contains a powerful value component and has a significant axiological aspect, designed to affirm humanistic ideals.

An important feature of philosophical reflection is doubt, which gives it a spiritual and practical orientation.

Philosophy arose approximately 2.5 thousand years ago, its emergence was facilitated by material And spiritual preconditions. ■ , ■..

To the material The prerequisites include the transition of mankind from bronze to iron, which led to a leap in the development of productive forces, intensified human activity and, as a result, caused the need to logically understand the world. It was on this basis that Hegel called philosophy an epoch captured in thought.

Spiritual the prerequisites (sources of philosophy) were mythology, pre-science, and everyday morality.

Mythology (from Greek mifos - legend, logos - word) is historically the first way to explain the essence of the world and man.

Myths existed among all peoples. In them, people tried to find answers to questions about the origin and structure of the world, the emergence of various natural phenomena, society and humans. Myths contained the rudiments of knowledge, religious beliefs, moral standards, historical evidence and performed the following functions in society:

formed a collective idea of ​​a particular phenomenon;

carried out a connection between generations, transmitted orally or in writing;

consolidated a certain system of values ​​and norms of behavior in society;

established the unity of man with the surrounding nature.

But as society developed, the mythological worldview ceased to satisfy people’s needs for knowledge and explanation of the world around them and gave way to philosophy.

The main differences between philosophy and mythology:

a) myths explained everything with the help of a deity, and philosophy turns to the very nature of a thing, looking for the causes of a phenomenon in itself;

b) the creators of myths did not prove their statements, but philosophers sought to provide evidence;

V) myth- is an emotional-psychological, artistic explanation of the world, whereas philosophy- rational explanation using concepts.

The second spiritual prerequisite for philosophy was pre-science, which begins with counting. Plato also drew attention to the fact that numbers and counting teach a person to think. It was mathematics that contributed

"because philosophy has moved on to evidence.

Astronomical speculation quickly became part of philosophical reflection.

/skie knowledge. Looking at the starry sky, people began to think about space, about the structure of the Universe.

"The third spiritual prerequisite of philosophy was everyday morality, which included traditions, prohibitions, norms and values ​​regulating the everyday behavior of people. In philosophy

a deeper understanding of them occurred, and an important section emerged, called ethics - the science of morality.

In philosophy, many schools and movements have emerged, which are divided into two large directions depending on the solution to the question of what comes first - matter or consciousness. Materialists recognized matter and nature as their basis. Idealists explained the world from spirit, consciousness, considering them a reliable reality. At the same time, objective idealists recognize as primary a principle independent of man - spirit, will, God. And subjective idealists believe that there is no real world outside of human consciousness. The world is the way we imagine it.

When addressing the question of the knowability of the world, philosophers divided into three directions:

cognitive optimism, whose supporters believe that the world is knowable;

skepticism ~ a philosophical concept that questions the possibility of knowing the world;

agnosticism- a doctrine that denies, in whole or in part, the possibility of knowing the world.

Philosophy performs a number of functions in society:

Worldview. Philosophy gives a person a system of general theoretical views on the world as a whole and man’s place in it.

Methodological function lies in the fact that philosophy develops the most general methods of research and knowledge, which are used not only by philosophy, but also by science.

Prognostic The function of philosophy is that it forms hypotheses about the general trends in the development of nature, man, his consciousness and society.

Critical function involves the search for truth through constructive criticism of the misconceptions and mistakes of predecessors.

Axiological the function of philosophy is to study the nature of values, as well as to evaluate phenomena and events from the point of view of goodness, justice, beauty, etc.

The structure of philosophical knowledge includes:

ontology- the doctrine of being.

epistemology- the doctrine of knowledge.

amtropology- the doctrine of man.

logic- the doctrine of the forms of correct evidential thinking.

ethics - the science of morality.

aesthetics- the science of beauty.

social philosophy- the doctrine of society.

Training tasks 11

1. Read in the book “The World of Philosophy: Book 1 with: Reading Guide” (Part I, pp. 12-13) Aristotle’s arguments about the essence of phi/- LOS0 F and and and give answers to the following questions:

Which person does Aristotle consider to be mudra*™ 1

What first prompted man to philosophize^ 0881^

What is the specificity of philosophical knowledge according to Aristotle?

Which of the functions of philosophy did you call the main ones?

1. Which of the following definitions ^ tos ofhii isoriginal?

a) the doctrine of primary essences;

b) the doctrine of wisdom;

d) love of wisdom.

TO 2. What functions does philosophy perform?

a) regulatory;

b) ideological;

c) aesthetic;

d) compensatory;

d) methodological.

3. The main question of philosophy is:

b) the question of whether the world is in motion^ Development;

c) the question of what comes first - matter or consciousness;

4.

a) materialists-metaphysics;

b) objective idealists;

c) agnostics;

d) subjective idealists.

5. Which philosophical movement does it deny?

atomism;

b) idealism;

c) materialism;

d) agnosticism.

6. What Signs are obligatory for a philosophical worldview?

a) system% ost;

b) simplicity ha -

c) visibility;

d) maximum generality.

7. Who is perr wow used the word “philosopher”?

a) Heracles^

c) Pythagoras;

d) Plato.

8. Limit chno a generalized, theoretical vision of the world is:

b) philosophy;

c) religion^;

d) political% a

9. Who said that philosophy is “an era captured in thought”?

a) Aristotle;

c) AQUINS1, KI Y;

d) Hegel.

10. Which; from provisions can be attributed to agnosticism: I a) the process of cognition is endless;

b) all our knowledge is only a hypothesis;

c) all scientific theories are incomplete and do not reflect the object absolutely accurately;

d) our knowledge of 0 MH pe is approximate. SECTION AND

HISTORICAL STAGESDEVELOPED PHILOSOPHY

Antique n philosophy

Ancient (philosophy arose at the turn of the 7th-6th centuries BC. At this time, important socio-economic and political changes took place in Greece. From a predominantly agricultural country, it turned into a center of craft and trade, which led to the growth of cities, the emergence of new classes - artisans, traders, who, in turn, began to influence political life.

E8E * Training tasks

:, 1. Read in the book “The World of Philosophy: A Book to Read” (Part I, ,With. 12-13) Aristotle’s reasoning about the essence of philosophy and give answers to the following questions: ,. - Which person does Aristotle consider to be wise?

What first prompted man to philosophize?

What is the specificity of philosophical knowledge according to Aristotle?

What is the purpose of philosophy?

Which of the functions of philosophy would you call the main ones?

Show the connection between ontology and epistemology.

1. Which of the following definitions of philosophy isoriginal?

a) the doctrine of primary essences;

b) the doctrine of wisdom;

c) form of theoretical worldview;

d) love of wisdom.

2. What functions does philosophy perform?

a) regulatory;

b) ideological;

c) aesthetic;

d) compensatory;

e) methodological.

3. The Basic Question of Philosophy- This:

a) the question of what peace is;

b) the question of whether the world is in motion and development;

c) the question of what comes first - matter or consciousness;

d) the question of what truth is.

4. The world as a complex of sensations is determined by:

a) materialists-metaphysics;

b) objective idealists;

c) agnostics;

d) subjective idealists.

5. Which philosophical movement denies the knowability of the world?

a) Thomism;

b) idealism;

c) materialism;

d) agnosticism.

■■?■-6. What features are required for a philosophical worldview?

a) systematic;

b) simplicity;

c) visibility;

d) maximum generality.

7. Who was the first to use the word "philosopher"?

a) Heraclitus;

c) Pythagoras;

d) Plato.

8. An extremely generalized, theoretical vision of the world- This:

b) philosophy;

c) religion;

d) politics.

9. Who said that philosophy is “an era captured in thought”?

a) Aristotle;

b) Kant; c) Aquinas;

d) Hegel. lj ®

10. Which of the following can be classified as agnosticism?

a) the process of cognition is endless;

b) all our knowledge is only hypotheses;

c) all scientific theories are incomplete and do not reflect the object absolutely accurately; ™

d) our knowledge of the world is approximate. "

Empirio-criticism found many followers among natural scientists, becoming, in particular, “physical idealism.” This is understandable: in accordance with the requirements of the spirit of the time, the true science of the foundations of being had to be based on the achievements of experimental sciences, which primarily included physics - the leader of natural science at that time; For most natural scientists and many philosophers, the concept of “physical reality” has become synonymous with the concept of “the true world, as it is in itself.” However, none other than Mach, an outstanding physicist, criticized this attitude in his philosophical works. That “physical idealism”, the basis of which

which Mach's philosophical ideas became, was not at all a worldview formulation of the achievements of physics as a private science, be it experimental or theoretical (mathematical) physics. After the cognitive process in physical science was subjected to epistemological criticism by Mach, the resulting product would be more correctly called “psychological idealism”: after all, “physical reality” (it makes no difference whether it is treated as a set of particles and fields or as a system of mathematical equations of theoretical physics) Mach and his followers reduced it to “complexes of sensations.”

From this point of view, empriocritics were more consistent in pursuing their anti-metaphysical program than many psychologists who sought to replace the philosophical doctrine of “spirit” with the results of scientific research into mental processes. So, if the psychologist I. Herbart (1776-1831), the author of a very popular textbook on psychology in the first quarter of the 19th century, would still like to explain “how perception is possible,” that is, to reveal the mechanism for generating perceptions as a result of the influence of certain external consciousness objects, then the philosopher E. Mach regarded such a desire of the scientist as a consequence of an unconscious metaphysical attitude, as a result of “introjection”. “Perception cannot be sought to be explained.” He eliminates as a “metaphysical” Cartesian problem of the relationship between res extensa and res cogitans, treating the sensualist analogue of res cogitans - perception - not as a consequence of the “mysterious” influence of one body on another, but on the contrary: in his opinion, the physical body as what is given in experience, it is itself formed from perceptions, that is, ultimately, it appears as a “complex of sensations.” As “naive subjectivism” Mach qualifies the opinion that what is seen by different people as different is a variation of appearance, while real existence is possessed by the unchangeable, “substance”. True, original, integral and “neutral” being is a “stream of sensations”; Mach interprets them as “neutral elements of the world”; being elements of experience, they are not ideal and not material - they are something primordial, and therefore “third”.

1 Mach E. Cognition and delusion. P. 44.

By the way, Mach included the atomistic concept in physics among the “subjectivist naiveties”: by attributing the “original”, pre-experienced reality to atoms, these “entities” invented by theorists, which cannot be reduced to sensations, in his opinion, it is easy to end up recognizing how he wrote, “a monstrous thing-in-itself”; for this, it is enough to “extract” the “elements”, meaning their qualities in things, one by one, and the “remainder” - a representation of the “whole”

"go" to be interpreted as "being". This is how philosophers appear "things-in-themselves", that is, things without qualities, a connection that does not connect anything, since it has nothing to connect. "Thing-in-itself", according to Mahu, is an “imaginary concept.” By eliminating it, we “lose” both the stability of the world in philosophical ontologies and its metaphysical “doubling,” revealing the true basis - the “flow” of experience.

Mach was not averse to recognizing, outside of philosophy, the value of the research of his “materialist” colleagues - physicists and other natural scientists: he regarded the methods of “psychological physiology” as “physical” and declared the possibility of reducing chemistry to physics, not considering such theses to contradict his main position , since in principle two reduction paths are possible. Perceptions themselves, from his point of view, do not contain anything subjective - after all, they exist before the splitting of the “flow” into subjective and objective begins. Materialists derive subjective perceptions from objective processes; idealists, on the contrary, are objects of subjective perceptions. Both are possible, as long as there is a connection between the subjective and the objective due to their common source. Having become, in his opinion, above the opposition of these metaphysical systems, Mach carries out an “extended reduction”, existentially universalizing perception. Without being, in his opinion, subjective initially, perception can still become so under certain conditions, when it acts as the “experienced content” of perception. Then the element, neutral in itself, becomes the “property” of the subject, “psychic”.

Since Mach does not make a strict distinction between the “psychic” and the “neutral,” his “monism of perception” turns out to be “psychomonism.” In his ontology, the elements of origin are not “decomposed” into subjective and objective. Only “later” does the primary state of the “world” (“flow”) oppose - as “unity” - the secondary, “split” state of the “world”, split into the “world of consciousness” and the “real world”.

During subsequent steps in the development of life, the primary state is deformed by external circumstances. Such deformations, fixed by memory, actualized in memories, determine subsequent perceptions. The remaining traces of the past (memories) make the life of an organism a cumulative process. This cumulative life process is “experience” or “intelligence”, in which recollection is the way in which consciousness brings the past up to date. Thanks to the processuality of consciousness, a person does not live “discretely”, in a series of “nows” replacing each other, but continuously - “retentionally”, “temporarily”. Therefore, temporaryness, for me -

Mach's knowledge is not given by nature - it is a creation of the organism. Only we, people, “glue together” the moments of our lives - not nature! In the same way, we “glue together” “complexes” from “elements”, and then treat them as substantial things. There are no “complexes” in nature itself, just as, naturally, there is no stability. Something is stabilized (more precisely, transformed by consciousness into a stable formation) only when it becomes the “seed” of a process reminiscent of the formation of a cluster of rock salt crystals: when something subsequent “joins” this initial “something” by us.

The simplest (and at the same time also the most important) way to stabilize a complex of “elements” is to attribute a “name” to the complex. It is an “acoustic sign” of a complex, preserving it in memory, the most constant and convenient sign. Around it, like a “core,” other signs grow. Therefore, a name is not a “label” of an object, but rather its “fittings”: it is functional, it “rightfully” represents the individual to which it refers. And it doesn’t matter that it is accidental in origin; it also does not matter that everything he once designated can change. If the name of a thing remains, then its “core” remains. The name is convenient - with its help we replace the whole in our consciousness with one sign, without losing integrity. Recognition of a thing, no matter how it occurs, is “stabilization,” the formation of a complex of sensations as an identical thing that exists through a name. Since there are names, there are no “similar” things, there are “identical” things. They are even more “personalities” than “things”. But if the word is preferable to begin with, then “in the future,” the concept is better for development. Although their essence is the same: it is “more economical” to treat unity as if it were identity, that is, “one and the same.”

The limitation and stabilization carried out by name and concept, according to Mach's concept, is the formation of complexes of elements. The concept “assimilates” perceptions; the elements do not themselves combine - they are connected by consciousness: the concept is a synthesis. Only the original world is at once “subjectless”, “objectless”, and “incomprehensible” - therefore there can be no memory of it. Analysis of memories leads to this limit, but not further, since the movement “against the flow” of accumulating “traces” - memories, against the flow of progressive synthesis, ends where the first step of synthesis takes place. Beyond this limit, of course, the Self itself disappears from the field of reflection, since the Self is “not a monad isolated from the world, but a part of the world in its flow, from which it originated and into which it should diffuse.”

• 1 Mach E. Cognition and delusion. P. 46.

It is not difficult to see that the ontology of empirio-criticism again bears traces of the “Cartesian impulse” with which all European philosophy, starting from the New Age, is charged: after all, empirio-criticism is nothing more than a type of introspection of the knowing subject. The specificity of this concept is biopsychologism: in place of the Cartesian cogito, it puts the “trinity” of consciousness, a living organism and the original, “neutral” “world substance”. Its significant difference from Cartesianism is also obvious: I in the role of the “island of being,” the “connecting center of the universe,” which withstood the onslaught of the hurricane of universal doubt, is rejected as a metaphysical prejudice; it dissolves into “pure perceptions.” The world ceases to be an “external world” as soon as the differences between res cogitans and res extensa are blurred, the “external” and “internal” worlds at their source merged - or, what is the same thing, disintegrated into incoherent fragments in Mach. Avenarius, however, did not go so far: he stopped before the last step of analysis, at the stage of “fundamental coordination” of the Self and the world, thereby preserving the Self as the “center of the world,” which is much closer to classical Cartesianism.